



EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels  
SANCO/G2 MMK/lp (2015) 2618786



**Subject: EU comments on the OIE Terrestrial Code**

Dear Director General,

Please find here attached the comments of the European Union on Annexes XXIV to XXX and XXXII of the report of the February 2015 meeting of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission, for consideration at its next meeting in September 2015.

We trust you will find this useful and I thank you for your continued good cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

<p>Félix Wildschutz CVO and OIE Delegate Luxembourg</p>	<p>Bernard Van Goethem Director for Veterinary and International Affairs European Commission, DG Health and Food Safety</p>
	

Dr B. Vallat  
Director General  
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)  
12, rue de Prony  
75017 Paris  
France

Annex: 1

Copy: All Directors / Chief Veterinary Officers of the EU 28 and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and Albania, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.

## GLOSSARY

### CASINGS

means bladders and intestines which, after cleaning, have been processed by tissue scraping and defatting.

#### EU comment

The EU in general supports this proposed new definition. However, it should be clarified from what animals casings are derived, i.e. from mammals (intestines of birds and bees are not used by the casings industry). Furthermore, the definition does not include any treatments (e.g. salting, bleaching, drying), other than the scraping and defatting processes and the cleaning. The casings as defined here thus are rather to be considered as raw materials for the production of sausage casings (raw casings or so called "green runners", usually traded in frozen state), and could thus lead to confusion between raw and treated products. Indeed, the word "casings" is usually not used for raw products but rather for commodities that have been submitted to a preservation treatment. In the OIE Code for example, the word "casings" is used mainly in connection with pathogen inactivation treatments (e.g. FMD, PPR, CSF chapters). In addition, "casings" are listed as safe commodity in the *Echinococcus granulosus* chapter. The EU therefore suggests modifying the definition as follows:

**"means bladders and intestines of mammals which, after cleaning, have been processed by tissue scraping and defatting and have been subject to a preservation treatment other than chilling or freezing"**

## CHAPTER 1.1.

**NOTIFICATION OF DISEASES, INFECTIONS AND  
INFESTATIONS, AND PROVISION OF  
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INFORMATION**

**EU comment**

**The EU in general supports the proposed changes to this chapter. Comments are inserted in the text below.**

## Article 1.1.1.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code* and in terms of Articles 5, 9 and 10 of the OIE Organic Statutes, Member Countries shall recognise the right of the *Headquarters* to communicate directly with the *Veterinary Authority* of its territory or territories.

All *notifications* and all information sent by the OIE to the *Veterinary Authority* shall be regarded as having been sent to the country concerned and all *notifications* and all information sent to the OIE by the *Veterinary Authority* shall be regarded as having been sent by the country concerned.

## Article 1.1.2.

- 1) Member Countries shall make available to other Member Countries, through the OIE, whatever information is necessary to minimise the spread of important animal *diseases*, and their aetiological agents, and to assist in achieving better worldwide control of these *diseases*.
- 2) To achieve this, Member Countries shall comply with the *notification* requirements specified in Articles 1.1.3. and 1.1.4.
- 3) To assist in the clear and concise exchange of information, reports shall conform as closely as possible to the official OIE *disease* reporting format.
- 4) The detection of the aetiological agent of a *listed disease* in an *animal* should be reported, even in the absence of clinical signs. Recognising that scientific knowledge concerning the relationship between *diseases* and their aetiological agents is constantly developing and that the presence of an aetiological agent does not necessarily imply the presence of a *disease*, Member Countries shall ensure, through their reports, that they comply with the spirit and intention of point 1 above.
- 5) In addition to notifying new findings in accordance with Articles 1.1.3. and 1.1.4., Member Countries shall also provide information on the measures taken to prevent the spread of *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations*. Information shall include quarantine measures and restrictions on the movement of *animals*, animal products, biological products and other miscellaneous objects which could by their nature be responsible for their transmission. In the case of *diseases* transmitted by *vectors*, the measures taken against such *vectors* shall also be specified.

## Article 1.1.3.

*Veterinary Authorities* shall, under the responsibility of the Delegate, send to the *Headquarters*:

- 1) in accordance with relevant provisions in the *disease-specific* chapters, *notification* through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) or by fax or e-mail, within 24 hours, of any of the following events:

**EU comment**

**The EU suggests clarifying in this Code chapter what exactly members are requested to send to the OIE. Indeed, this article merely speaks of notification of events, without specifying details of the data that is to be included in the notification. This leads to different levels of reporting detail, with sometimes important information missing or imprecise information. The EU therefore suggests adding this to the work programme of the Code Commission.**

- a) first occurrence of a *listed disease, infection or infestation* in a country, a *zone* or a *compartment*;
  - b) re-occurrence of a *listed disease, infection or infestation* in a country, a *zone* or a *compartment* following the final report that declared the *outbreak* ended;
  - c) first occurrence of a new strain of a pathogen of a *listed disease, infection or infestation* in a country, a *zone* or a *compartment*;
  - d) a sudden and unexpected change in the distribution or increase in incidence or virulence of, or morbidity or mortality caused by, the aetiological agent of a *listed disease, infection or infestation* present within a country, a *zone* or a *compartment*;
  - e) occurrence of a *listed disease, infection or infestation* in an unusual host species;
- 2) weekly reports subsequent to a *notification* under point 1 above, to provide further information on the evolution of the event which justified the *notification*. These reports should continue until the *disease, infection or infestation* has been eradicated or the situation has become sufficiently stable so that six-monthly reporting under point 3 will satisfy the obligation of the Member Country; for each event notified, a final report on the event should be submitted;
  - 3) six-monthly reports on the absence or presence, and evolution of *listed diseases, infections or infestations* and information of epidemiological significance to other Member Countries;
  - 4) annual reports concerning any other information of significance to other Member Countries.

## Article 1.1.4.

Veterinary Authorities shall, under the responsibility of the Delegate, send to the *Headquarters*:

- 1) a *notification* through WAHIS or by fax or e-mail, when an *emerging disease* has been detected in a country, a *zone* or a *compartment*;
- 2) periodic reports subsequent to a *notification* of an *emerging disease*, ~~as described under point 1.~~ These should continue ~~until:~~
  - a) for the time necessary to have reasonable certainty that:
    - i) the *disease, infection or infestation* has been eradicated; or
    - ii) the situation has becomes ~~sufficiently~~ stable; or

OR

  - b) until sufficient scientific information is available to determine whether it meets the criteria for listing.

**EU comment**

**The EU strongly supports the proposed changes to the article on the notification of emerging diseases, and requests that this change, once adopted by the World Assembly, be reflected in WAHIS. Indeed, currently it is not possible to indicate in WAHIS that a disease no longer is an "emerging disease" based on this last point above (i.e. when sufficient scientific information is available to determine that it does not meet the criteria for listing).**

Article 1.1.5.

- 1) The *Veterinary Authority* of a country in which an *infected zone* was located shall inform the *Headquarters* when this zone is free from the *disease, infection or infestation*.
- 2) An *infected zone* for a particular *disease, infection or infestation* shall be considered as such until a period exceeding the *infective period* specified in the *Terrestrial Code* has elapsed after the last reported *case*, and when full prophylactic and appropriate animal health measures have been applied to prevent possible reappearance or spread of the *disease, infection or infestation*. These measures will be found in detail in the various chapters of Volume II of the *Terrestrial Code*.
- 3) A Member Country may be considered to regain freedom from a specific *disease, infection or infestation* when all relevant conditions given in the *Terrestrial Code* have been fulfilled.
- 4) The *Veterinary Authority* of a Member Country which sets up one or several *free zones* shall inform the *Headquarters* giving necessary details, including the criteria on which the free status is based, the requirements for maintaining the status and indicating clearly the location of the *zones* on a map of the territory of the Member Country.

Article 1.1.6.

- 1) Although Member Countries are only required to notify *listed diseases, infections and infestation and emerging diseases*, they are encouraged to inform the OIE of other important animal health events.
- 2) The *Headquarters* shall communicate by e-mail or World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) to *Veterinary Authorities* all *notifications* received as provided in Articles 1.1.2. to 1.1.5. and other relevant information.

---

-----

— Text deleted.

## CHAPTER 1.2.

**CRITERIA FOR THE INCLUSION OF DISEASES,  
INFECTIONS AND INFESTATIONS IN THE OIE  
LIST**

**EU comments**

**The EU thanks the OIE and in general supports the proposed changes to this chapter. Comments are inserted in the text below.**

## Article 1.2.1.

**Introduction**

~~The aim of this chapter is to describe~~ This chapter is to describe the criteria for the inclusion of *diseases, infections and infestations* ~~in on~~ the OIE list.

The objective of listing is to support Member Countries' by providing information needed to take appropriate action ~~efforts~~ to prevent the transboundary spread of important animal *diseases*, including *zoonoses*. This is achieved by through transparent, timely and consistent notification reporting.

Each *listed disease* normally has a corresponding chapter that ~~to~~ assists Member Countries in the harmonisation of *disease* detection, prevention and control- and provides standards for safe international trade in animals and their products.

Requirements for *notification* are detailed in Chapter 1.1. ~~and notifications are to be made through WAHIS or, if not possible, by fax or e-mail as described in Article 1.1.3.~~

Principles for selection of diagnostic tests are described in Chapter 1.1.5. of the Terrestrial Manual.

## Article 1.2.2.

The criteria for the inclusion of a *disease, infection or infestation* in the OIE list are as follows:

- 1) International spread of the agent (via live *animals* or their products, *vectors* or fomites) has been proven.

AND

- 2) At least one country has demonstrated freedom or impending freedom from the *disease, infection or infestation* in populations of susceptible *animals*, based on the ~~animal health surveillance provisions of the Terrestrial Code, in particular those contained in Chapter 1.4.~~

AND

- 3) A Reliable means of detection and diagnosis exists and a precise case definition is available to clearly identify cases and allow them to be distinguished from other *diseases, infections and infestations.*

AND

~~4)~~

- a) Natural transmission to humans has been proven, and human infection is associated with severe consequences.

OR

- b) The *disease* has been shown to cause a significant impact on the health of morbidity or mortality in domestic animals at the level of a country or a zone taking into account the occurrence and severity of the clinical signs, including direct production losses and mortality.

OR

- c) The *disease* has been shown to, or scientific evidence indicates that it would, cause a significant impact on the health of morbidity or mortality in wild wildlife animal populations taking into account the occurrence and severity of the clinical signs, including direct production losses and mortality, and ecological threats.

AND

- 4) ~~A reliable means of detection and diagnosis exists and a precise case definition is available to clearly identify cases and allow them to be distinguished from other diseases, infections and infestations.~~

CHAPTER 1.2.BIS

DISEASES LISTED BY THE OIE

~~Article 1.2.3.~~

**EU comment**

**The EU thanks the OIE for having considered our previous suggestion to move the list of diseases into a separate new chapter, as is already the case in the Aquatic Code, and fully supports this proposal for a new Chapter 1.2.bis.**

**However, the EU suggests creating separate articles for the individual categories of diseases, and thus removing the current numbering (i.e. "1") and replacing it by new articles throughout the new chapter (i.e. new Article 1.2.bis.1. until 1.2.bis.9.).**

Preamble

The following *diseases, infections and infestations* are included in the OIE list.

In case of modifications of this list of animal *diseases, infections and infestations* adopted by the World Assembly, the new list comes into force on 1 January of the following year.

Article 1.2bis.1.

- 1) The following are included within the category of multiple species *diseases, infections and infestations*:
- Anthrax
  - Bluetongue
  - Brucellosis (*Brucella abortus*)
  - Brucellosis (*Brucella melitensis*)
  - Brucellosis (*Brucella suis*)
  - Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever
  - Epizootic haemorrhagic disease

- Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern)
  - Foot and mouth disease
  - Heartwater
  - Infection with Aujeszky's disease virus
  - Infection with *Echinococcus granulosus*
  - Infection with *Echinococcus multilocularis*
  - Infection with rabies virus
  - Infection with Rift Valley fever virus
  - Infection with rinderpest virus
  - Infection with *Trichinella* spp.
  - Japanese encephalitis
  - New World screwworm (*Cochliomyia hominivorax*)
  - Old World screwworm (*Chrysomya bezziana*)
  - Paratuberculosis
  - Q fever
  - Surra (*Trypanosoma evansi*)
  - Tularemia
  - West Nile fever.
- 2) The following are included within the category of cattle *diseases* and *infections*:
- Bovine anaplasmosis
  - Bovine babesiosis
  - Bovine genital campylobacteriosis
  - Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
  - Bovine tuberculosis
  - Bovine viral diarrhoea
  - Enzootic bovine leukosis
  - Haemorrhagic septicaemia
  - Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/infectious pustular vulvovaginitis
  - Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)
  - Lumpy skin disease
  - Theileriosis



- Trichomonosis
  - Trypanosomosis (tsetse-transmitted).
- 3) The following are included within the category of sheep and goat *diseases* and *infections*:
- Caprine arthritis/encephalitis
  - Contagious agalactia
  - Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
  - Infection with *Chlamydophila abortus* (Enzootic abortion of ewes, ovine chlamydiosis)
  - Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus
  - Maedi-visna
  - Nairobi sheep disease
  - Ovine epididymitis (*Brucella ovis*)
  - Salmonellosis (*S. abortus ovis*)
  - Scrapie
  - Sheep pox and goat pox.
- 4) The following are included within the category of equine *diseases* and *infections*:
- Contagious equine metritis
  - Dourine
  - Equine encephalomyelitis (Western)
  - Equine infectious anaemia
  - Equine influenza
  - Equine piroplasmosis
  - Glanders
  - Infection with African horse sickness virus
  - Infection with equid herpesvirus-1 (EHV-1)
  - Infection with equine arteritis virus
  - Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis.
- 5) The following are included within the category of swine *diseases* and *infections*:
- African swine fever
  - Infection with classical swine fever virus
  - Nipah virus encephalitis
  - Porcine cysticercosis
  - Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
  - Transmissible gastroenteritis.

- 6) The following are included within the category of avian *diseases* and *infections*:
- Avian chlamydiosis
  - Avian infectious bronchitis
  - Avian infectious laryngotracheitis
  - Avian mycoplasmosis (*Mycoplasma gallisepticum*)
  - Avian mycoplasmosis (*Mycoplasma synoviae*)
  - Duck virus hepatitis
  - Fowl typhoid
  - Infection with avian influenza viruses
  - Infection with influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity in birds other than poultry including wild birds
  - Infection with Newcastle disease virus
  - Infectious bursal disease (Gumboro disease)
  - Pullorum disease
  - Turkey rhinotracheitis.
- 7) The following are included within the category of lagomorph *diseases* and *infections*:
- Myxomatosis
  - Rabbit haemorrhagic disease.
- 8) The following are included within the category of bee *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations*:
- Infection of honey bees with *Melissococcus plutonius* (European foulbrood)
  - Infection of honey bees with *Paenibacillus larvae* (American foulbrood)
  - Infestation of honey bees with *Acarapis woodi*
  - Infestation of honey bees with *Tropilaelaps* spp.
  - Infestation of honey bees with *Varroa* spp. (Varroosis)
  - Infestation with *Aethina tumida* (Small hive beetle).
- 9) The following are included within the category of other *diseases* and *infections*:
- Camelpox
  - Leishmaniosis.

---

-----

– Text deleted.

DRAFT CHAPTER 6.X.

**PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF SALMONELLA  
IN COMMERCIAL CATTLE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS**

**EU comment**

The EU in general welcomes this initiative of the OIE to also include a chapter on Salmonella control in commercial cattle production systems in the OIE Code, after recently having started work on a chapter on Salmonella control in pig herds. This also against the background that Codex Alimentarius is currently preparing specific guidelines on non typhoidal Salmonella spp. in beef and pork meat.

Moreover, the EU is of the opinion that it would be very important to have more general Code chapters on biosecurity procedures in both pig and cattle production, similar to the existing chapter on biosecurity procedures in poultry production. Indeed, such horizontal chapters would serve the purposes also for other zoonotic and animal health diseases, instead of focusing on Salmonella control only. This against the background that in the EU, the public health impact of Salmonella linked to cattle is relatively low when compared to poultry and pigs. The EU would therefore encourage the OIE to also engage in work on such horizontal chapters on biosecurity procedures in pig and cattle production.

The EU in general supports this proposed new chapter. Specific comments are inserted in the text below.

In general, it has to be stressed that controlling or eradicating Salmonella at herd level requires improvement of herd hygiene and good internal and external biosecurity. We think that this could be achieved by changing the headings of the chapter to be more in line with the chapter on prevention and control of salmonella in poultry.

The EU also suggests that the key differences between bacteriology and serology are further described, for example to clarify that groups of animals positive on bacteriology are infectious, whereas groups that are seropositive do not necessarily have to be infectious and that seronegative groups could be infectious (i.e. newly infected or infected with a serotype giving a weak or no response in the ELISA test). These differences are important in the light of testing to ensure that infectious cattle are not delivered to slaughter or to other herds.

Furthermore, we suggest including that bacteriology is required for source attribution studies. Such studies are important for evaluation of control measures and have successfully been used by some countries to control and eradicate Salmonella in the poultry sector.

Article 6.X.1.

**Introduction**

Nontyphoidal salmonellosis is one of the most common food-borne bacterial diseases in the world with *Salmonella* Enteritidis and *S. Typhimurium* (including monophasic variants) the predominant serotypes identified in most countries. In addition, a limited number of other serotypes associated with cattle may cause salmonellosis in humans, for example *S. Dublin* and *S. Newport*.

As is the case in most food producing *animals*, *Salmonella infection* in cattle is mostly subclinical, although clinical *disease* such as enteritis, septicæmia or abortion can occur. Subclinical *infection* can be of variable duration including a carrier state and can play an important role in the spread of *Salmonella* within and between *herds* and pose a public health risk.

#### EU comment

The EU suggests adding the following sentence after the paragraph above:

**"Proper hygienic routines and management are efficient measures to prevent and combat Salmonella."** .

*Herd* size and stocking density may influence the *risk* of introduction, dissemination or persistence of *Salmonella*; however, this is also dependent on geographical region, husbandry and other factors such as season and age.

*Salmonella* serotypes and their *prevalence* in cattle may vary considerably between farms, countries and regions. It is important for *Veterinary Authorities* to consider types of *Salmonella*, their occurrence and the *disease* burden in cattle and human populations if developing and implementing strategies for the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in cattle.

Article 6.X.2.

#### Definitions

#### EU comment

The EU suggests clarifying that these definitions are for the purpose of this chapter only. Alternatively, the definitions should be moved to the glossary if they are used in other chapters and are to apply to the Code in general.

**Commercial cattle production systems:** means those systems where the purpose of the operation includes some or all of the breeding, rearing and management of cattle for the production of *meat* and *meat products* or *milk* and *milk products*.

**Intensive cattle production systems:** means commercial systems where cattle are in confinement and are fully dependent on humans to provide for basic animal needs such as food, shelter and water on a daily basis.

**Extensive cattle production systems:** means commercial systems where cattle have the freedom to roam outdoors, and where the cattle have some autonomy over diet selection (through grazing), water consumption and access to shelter.

**Semi-intensive cattle production systems:** means commercial systems where cattle are exposed to any combination of both intensive and extensive husbandry methods, either simultaneously or variably according to changes in climatic conditions or physiological state of the cattle.

Article 6.X.3.

#### Purpose and scope

The purpose of this chapter is to provide recommendations for the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in cattle in order to reduce the burden of *disease* in cattle and the *risk* of human illness through food-borne contamination as well as human *infections* resulting from direct or indirect contact with cattle (e.g. via faeces or abortion material).

#### EU comment

**In addition, the risk of spread to the surrounding environment and other herds is reduced. This should be included in the paragraph above.**

This chapter applies to cattle (*Bos taurus*, *B. indicus* and *B. grunniens*), water buffaloes (*Bubalus bubalis*) and wood bison (*Bison bison* and *B. bonasus*) kept in commercial cattle production systems.

This chapter should be read in conjunction with the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice for Meat (CAC/RCP 58-2005) and the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice for Milk and Milk Products (CAC/RCP 57-2004).

#### Article 6.X.4.

##### Objectives of prevention and control measures

It is recommended that prevention and control be focused on those types of *Salmonella* of greatest consequence to cattle or public health.

Reduction of *Salmonella* in cattle in primary production may reduce the level of the pathogen:

- 1) entering the *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and therefore decrease the *risk* of beef contamination during *slaughter* and dressing procedures;
- 2) in *milk* and *milk products*;

##### EU comment

**Point 2 above should focus on unpasteurised milk and milk products ("2) in unpasteurised milk and milk products;"), as pasteurisation significantly reduces the *Salmonella* risk associated with these commodities.**

- 3) in the farm environment, thereby reducing the risk of dissemination of *Salmonella* and contact *infections* in humans.

Articles 6.X.5. to 6.X.14. provide recommendations for the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in cattle.

These recommendations may also have beneficial effects on the occurrence of other *infections* and *diseases*.

##### EU comment

**The EU suggests rephrasing the sentence above as follows:**

**"Some of these recommendations may also have beneficial effects on the occurrence of other intestinal carried infections and diseases at herd level."**

#### Article 6.X.5.

##### Location and design of cattle establishments

When making decisions on the location and design of cattle *establishments*, it is recommended that mitigation of the *risk* of transfer of pathogens, including *Salmonella*, from major sources of contamination be considered. Sources of *Salmonella* may include other livestock *establishments* or areas of application or disposal of contaminated waste or effluent. Transfer of *Salmonella* between *establishments* may involve carriage by wild birds, rodents, flies and other *wildlife*.

It is recommended that the design of intensive cattle systems consider the following:

##### EU comment

**As the measures are also to a large extent applicable to extensive cattle systems, the sentence above should be amended as follows:**

**"It is recommended that the design of intensive cattle systems consider the following biosecurity measures as applicable."**

**As a consequence, the sentence after point 6) below should be deleted.**

1) adequate drainage for the site and control of run-off and untreated waste water;

**EU comment**

**It is suggested to insert the words "provision of" before the words "adequate drainage" in point 1) above.**

2) use of materials for construction that facilitate effective cleaning and *disinfection*;

3) control of the points of entry;

4) cattle handling and movements to minimise stress and spread of *Salmonella infection*;

5) separation of cattle of different *risk* status;

6) restriction of entry of wild birds, rodents, flies and other relevant *wildlife*.

In extensive cattle production systems, location and design options may be limited; however, applicable biosecurity measures should be considered.

**EU comment**

**Regarding the list above, the EU suggests the following:**

**The need of sectioning of the animals should be mentioned. Indeed, it is considerably harder to achieve effective cleaning without risk of spreading *Salmonella* to other animals in the same part of the building if it is not possible to empty it of animals.**

**It should be stressed that storage and transport of feed within an establishment are critical to maintain good biosecurity and to lower the risk of introducing and spreading *Salmonella* to or within the herd. Furthermore, these issues must be considered early in the process of designing a new establishment, otherwise it will be difficult and costly to change.**

**Feed and water to the animals should be protected from direct and indirect contamination by manure.**

**Efficient systems for removing and storing manure are important to keep stables clean and avoiding contamination of stables and other surfaces. Storage of manure should be positioned so that transport of manure can be performed without crossing pathways for feed transports within the farm.**

**Plans for a separate area or stable where new animals can be isolated before introduction into the herd, as well as separate pens for sick animals. In addition, separate areas for animals of different age categories should be available, as young animals are generally more sensitive to *Salmonella* infection.**

**Groups of animals should preferably be kept small and if possible not be mixed.**

Article 6.X.6.

**Biosecurity management plan**

Biosecurity measures that include management and physical factors designed to reduce the *risk* of introduction, establishment and spread of animal *diseases*, *infections* or *infestations* to, from and within an animal population would also be expected to assist with the prevention and control of *Salmonella*.

When developing a biosecurity management plan it is recommended that the following be taken into

consideration:

**EU comment**

**In general, it might be easier for the reader if the biosecurity points below were divided into external and internal biosecurity.**

- 1) Veterinary supervision of cattle health.
- 2) Management of introduction and mixing of cattle.
- 3) Training of personnel in their responsibilities and their role in animal health, human health and food safety.
- 4) Maintenance of records including data on cattle health, production, movements, medications, *vaccination*, and mortality, and cleaning and *disinfection* of farm buildings and equipment.
- 5) Availability of test results to the farm operator when *Salmonella surveillance* is conducted.
- 6) Removal of unwanted vegetation and debris that could attract or harbour pests around cattle premises .
- 7) Minimising the entry of wild birds into cattle buildings and feed stores.
- 8) Cleaning and *disinfection* procedures for buildings in which cattle are handled or housed. For example, the cleaning and *disinfection* procedures for intensive calf housing, calving areas and sick pens after emptying may include feeders, drinkers, floor, walls, aisles, partitions between pens, and ventilation ducting.

When disinfectants are used they should be applied at an effective concentration after a complementary cleaning procedure.

**EU comment**

**The EU suggests indicating in the sentence above that it is important to follow the instructions of the disinfectant manufacturer, not only as regards concentration, but also as regards contact time, which is often temperature dependent.**

**Furthermore, the EU suggests adding the following to the point above:**

**"Cleaning procedures that generate aerosols (i.e. high pressure washers) should only be used in empty buildings. If that is not possible, the animals, as well as their feed and water, should be protected from the aerosols".**

- 9) Control of pests such as rodents and arthropods when required and regular assessment of effectiveness.
- 10) Control of persons and *vehicles* entering the *establishment*.

**EU comment**

**In point 10) above, it should be clarified what is meant by "control". In practice it means absolutely clean from manure. Parts that come in direct contact with the animals or their feeding or watering surfaces should also be disinfected if they have been in contact with manure from another herd.**

- 11) Cleaning and *disinfection* of *vehicles* and equipment identified as a *risk*.
- 12) Storage and disposal of cattle carcasses, bedding, faeces and other potentially contaminated farm waste in a safe manner to minimise the risk of dissemination of *Salmonella* and to prevent the direct or indirect exposure of humans, livestock and *wildlife* to *Salmonella*. Particular care to be taken when

cattle bedding and faeces are used as fertiliser for horticultural crops intended for human consumption.

**EU comment**

**In point 12) above, it should be clarified what is meant by "in a safe manner".**

Article 6.X.7.

**Management of cattle introductions**

To minimise the *risk* of introducing *Salmonella* through cattle introductions, it is recommended that:

- 1) There be good communication within the cattle industry to raise awareness of the *risk* of introducing *Salmonella* through cattle introductions.
- 2) The number of separate sources of cattle for breeding or rearing be kept to as few as possible. For example in a closed dairy *herd* it is possible to introduce new genetic material solely by semen or embryos.
- 3) If possible, cattle be sourced directly from *herds* of origin because live animal markets or other places where cattle from multiple properties are mixed for resale may increase the risk of spread of *Salmonella* and other *infections* among cattle.

**EU comment**

**In point 3) above, the words "transport vehicles" should be inserted after "live animal markets".**

- 4) Newly introduced cattle be kept separate from the rest of the *herd* for a suitable period before mixing with other cattle, e.g. four weeks.

**EU comment**

**While the recommendation of point 4) above lowers the risk of *Salmonella* introduction, it is not sufficient to fully protect the herd. For a higher security level, testing of the new animals while in isolation and before mixing with the herd should be performed.**

**Moreover, it is suggested to replace "e.g." by "ideally for up to"**

- 5) Where appropriate, for example with cattle of unknown status, pooled faecal samples from introduced cattle could be taken to assess their *Salmonella* status.

**EU comment**

**Introduction of new animals or contact with animals from other herds poses a risk of introduction of infections including *Salmonella*. Known herd status by way of herd sampling for *Salmonella* is recommended. If herd status is not known, sampling of the group of animals being purchased can reduce the risk of introducing *Salmonella*. The suitable sampling protocol will vary depending on the status of the herd and the *Salmonella* situation in the cattle population.**

Article 6.X.8.

**On farm cattle management**

To minimise the risk of transferring *Salmonella* among cattle, it is recommended that:

- 1) Cattle with suspected salmonellosis be separated from healthy cattle.

**EU comment**



As regards point 1) above, it should also be considered that salmonellosis often presents as subclinical infection or with only mild clinical symptoms and it therefore may be difficult to identify infected animals. To separate clinically ill cattle is not enough to eliminate the infection in the group. In addition, it might be difficult to identify and separate cattle with diarrhoea. However, it is an important measure among calves, particularly in group pens.

- 2) Care of healthy cattle be carried out prior to care of cattle with suspected salmonellosis.
- 3) Priority be given to the hygienic management of calving areas, for example keeping perinatal cattle separated from sick cattle and maintaining a clean environment.

#### EU comment

If possible calves should be kept separate from older animals. Routines around calving, such as calving in clean, preferably separated pens and quick removal of the calf is beneficial for within herd control of *Salmonella*. Moreover, keeping a clean environment around calves and strict routines to make sure calves are fed colostrum and fed properly thereafter are important.

- 4) When possible, the 'all-in-all-out' principle for production cohorts be used. In particular, the mixing of different age groups during rearing of calves should be avoided.

#### EU comment

As it is difficult to decide status of infection for individual animals based on clinical signs or sampling, the general recommendation should be to avoid unnecessary mixing of animals from different groups, regardless of the age of the animals.

Moreover, the word "**should**" should be inserted after the word "cohorts".

- 5) Consideration be given to the potential for between-herd transmission of *Salmonella* via rearing and grazing of cattle from multiple sources on a single site, for example shared pasture and heifer rearing.

#### EU comment

This might be achieved by only mixing animals with the same herd status for *Salmonella*.

- 6) Consideration be given to the potential for between-herd transmission of *Salmonella* through direct contact between cattle across boundary lines or indirectly through contamination of water courses.

#### EU comment

Local spread of salmonella might occur via many routes when animals from different herds have direct contact with each other. Moreover, indirect contacts via contaminated manure might cause spread between herds, such as via drinking water from natural water sources shared by other herds or spread of manure particularly at grazing areas and if animals drink from the open water which leads to faecal contamination of the water.

#### Article 6.X.9.

##### Feed and water

##### 1. Compound feed and feed ingredients

Compound feed and feed ingredients can be sources of *Salmonella infection* for cattle. For the effective control of *Salmonella* it is recommended that:

- a) Where appropriate, compound feed and feed ingredients be produced, handled, stored,

transported and distributed according to Good Manufacturing Practices, considering Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles and recommendations in accordance with Chapter 6.3.

- b) Compound feed and feed ingredients be transported and stored in a hygienic manner that minimises access by wild birds, rodents and other *wildlife*.

#### EU comment

The EU suggests amending point b) as follows:

**"Compound feed and feed ingredients be transported, and stored and fed in a hygienic manner that minimises access by wild birds, rodents and other wildlife and minimizes the risk of contamination by manure."**

#### 2. Water

Where there is reason to be concerned about *infection* of cattle with *Salmonella* from contaminated water, measures be taken to evaluate and minimise the *risk*. For example sediment in water troughs may act as a reservoir for contamination.

#### EU comment

The EU suggests adding the following at the end of point 2 above:

**"At pasture, ponds should be avoided as a water source."**

**Moreover, the word "should" should be inserted after the word "measures".**

Article 6.X.10.

#### Prevention, treatment and control measures

- 1) *Antimicrobial agents* may modify normal flora in the gut and increase the likelihood of colonisation by *Salmonella*. If *antimicrobial agents* are used, they should be used in accordance with Chapter 6.9.

*Antimicrobial agents* should not be used to control subclinical *infection* with *Salmonella* in cattle because the effectiveness of the treatment is limited, they may increase the risk of *Salmonella* colonisation, and their use can contribute to the development of antimicrobial resistance.

- 2) *Vaccination* may be used as part of a *Salmonella* control programme. Vaccine production and use should be in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual*. The protective effect of vaccines is generally serotype specific and few licensed vaccines are available for cattle.
- 3) Use of probiotics may reduce colonisation of cattle by *Salmonella* and shedding of *Salmonella*; however, efficacy is variable.
- 4) Because conditions such as liver fluke and infection with bovine viral diarrhoea virus may increase the susceptibility of cattle to *Salmonella*, control of these conditions is recommended.
- 5) The immune status of calves is important and therefore care should be taken to ensure that newborn calves consume adequate amounts of high quality colostrum.

Article 6.X.11.

#### Transportation

The relevant recommendations in Chapter 7.3. apply.

When transporting animals from multiple *establishments*, it is recommended that the *Salmonella* status of the *establishments* be considered to avoid cross-contamination of cattle.

#### EU comment

**The EU suggests adding a recommendation regarding the cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicles.**

Article 6.X.12.

#### **Lairage**

Relevant aspects of *lairage* management include consideration of effective cleaning and *disinfection* between groups, minimising mixing of separate groups and managing stress.

#### **EU comment**

**In the sentence above, the EU suggests inserting the words "of animals that had not continually been kept together" after the words "separate groups".**

In addition the relevant recommendations in Articles 7.5.1., 7.5.3. and 7.5.4. apply.

Article 6.X.13.

#### **Surveillance in cattle**

*Surveillance* data provide information to assist the *Competent Authorities* in their decision making regarding the requirement for, and design of, control programmes. Sampling and testing methods, frequency and type of samples required should be determined by the *Veterinary Services*.

#### **EU comment**

**At the end of the point above, the EU suggests replacing the words "*Veterinary Services*" by the words "*Veterinary Authorities*", at it seems to be the more appropriate term in this context.**

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*. In addition, other sampling and testing methodologies such as testing of bulk milk or serum samples by ELISA may provide useful information on herd or individual animal status. Boot swab samples from communal areas in cattle housing, slurry samples or lymph nodes collected post-mortem can also be useful for microbiological testing. Some types of *Salmonella* such as *S. Dublin* can be difficult to detect through microbiological methods.

#### **EU comment**

**The EU suggests inserting the words "and caecal samples" after the words "or lymph nodes" in the paragraph above, as this type of post-mortem samples are considered in prevalence studies of *Salmonella* in cattle.**

If *vaccination* is used, it may not be possible to distinguish between vaccinated and infected cattle by means of serological testing.

Article 6.X.14.

#### **Prevention and control in low prevalence regions**

In regions where *Salmonella infection* of cattle is uncommon, it may be possible to eliminate *infection* from *herds* through a combination of *herd surveillance*, individual testing, movement controls, and possible removal of persistent carriers.

#### **EU comment**

**Experience has shown that it is indeed possible to eliminate infection from herds in low prevalence regions. The most important measure to eliminate *Salmonella* from an infected herd is to improve hygiene in all parts of the establishment, prior to all of the above mentioned measures. Individual testing is only used at group level to evaluate the effect of the hygienic measures implemented.**

**Regarding "individual testing" and "possible removal of persistent carriers", this indicates that the infection can be eliminated by measures on individual level. However, experience shows that *Salmonella* must rather be addressed at group and herd level.**

**Movement control from infected herds should be implemented alongside the improved hygiene to prevent spreading to other herds.**

UNOFFICIAL VERSION

— Text deleted.

**DRAFT**

**GUIDELINES ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND RISK REDUCTION IN RELATION TO  
ANIMAL HEALTH AND WELFARE AND VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH  
(GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL VETERINARY SERVICES)**

**EU comment**

**The EU thanks the OIE for its work on this new draft text. We have some comments to the draft guideline as indicated below.**

**1. INTRODUCTION**

The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) has developed these guidelines for disaster management and risk reduction in relation to animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health with the goal of strengthening the capacity of Veterinary Services in Member Countries.

Recent disaster events highlight the need to bring all components of disaster management together in cohesive response plans at both national and international levels using a multidisciplinary approach to achieve optimal efficiency and effectiveness.

The OIE guidelines use an all-hazards approach to the management of natural and man-made and technological disasters and suggest that a wide range of stakeholders from both government and society take action, adapting their interventions to meet local and regional needs.

They advocate the integration of disaster management and risk reduction measures relevant to national Veterinary Services into broader resilience and disaster management and response networks and policies, i.e. those that promote the health and welfare of animals, safeguard human and environmental health and assist Member Countries to restore and enhance economic and societal conditions in the aftermath of a disaster.

**1.1 SCOPE**

These guidelines reflect the need for Veterinary Services to implement disaster management and disaster risk reduction measures with the objective of protecting animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health during disaster events in their respective countries.

The document is aligned with OIE standards for Veterinary Services and animal welfare.

These guidelines provide a framework that veterinary professionals can use to develop processes and procedures for managing the veterinary sector's actions to reduce the adverse consequences of disasters. They outline guiding principles and the roles that Veterinary Services play in reducing the impact of disasters in all phases of the Disaster Management Cycle (DMC). They also highlight the importance of intra- and inter-institutional coordination and emphasise that the mandate of Veterinary Services falls within the larger national legal framework.

These guidelines complement existing technical and legal instruments for disaster management, both those at international and regional levels and those adopted in each Member Country, all of which

specify the mandate of relevant actors in disaster situations. They are meant to be applied in conjunction with these existing tools.

The document does not prescribe how Veterinary Services should act, but leaves it to each OIE Member Country to adapt to local needs based on their context. It identifies inter-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approaches as essential principles in disaster management and stresses that the plans of Veterinary Services should be included in the National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans.

## 1.2 DEFINITIONS

There are many variations of definitions in the field of disaster management and risk reduction. The *ad hoc* Group of experts formed by the OIE to draft these guidelines has selected the following working definitions with the intent of following as closely as possible standard international definitions. Additional definitions on specific topics are included within the text of the guidelines. Individual countries and organisations may have different variations that they are required to use.

### *Disaster*

means ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’. (UNISDR, 2015)

### *Hazard*

In these guidelines the UNISDR definition of hazard is used which means ‘a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage’. *Technological/Man-made disaster*

#### **EU comment**

**A line break has been omitted in in the above paragraph as the heading "Technological/Man-made disaster" should be linked to the definition which follows below.**

means ‘a hazard originating from technological or industrial conditions or caused by man, including complex emergencies/conflicts, famine, displaced populations, industrial accidents and transport accidents. These are events that are caused by humans and occur in or close to human settlements. This can include environmental degradation, pollution and accidents’. (IFRC, 2015)

#### **EU comment**

**The EU asks the OIE to consider including a new category in the first sentence of the above paragraph:**

**"means ‘a hazard originating from technological or industrial conditions or caused by man, including complex emergencies/conflicts, famine, displaced populations, industrial accidents, terrorist attacks and transport accidents."**

#### **Justification:**

**Terrorist attacks may also lead to loss of life, injuries, etc. as other hazards.**

### *Natural hazard*

means ‘the naturally occurring physical phenomena caused either by rapid or slow onset events which can be geophysical (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis and volcanic activity), hydrological (avalanches and floods), climatological (extreme temperatures, drought and wildfires), meteorological (cyclones and storms/wave surges) or biological (disease epidemics and insect/animal plagues)’. (IFRC, 2015)

## *Resilience*

means ‘the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. It is determined by the degree to which the community has the necessary resources and is capable of organising itself both prior to and during times of need’. (UNISDR, 2015).

## 2. THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT CYCLE

The objectives for Veterinary Services in disaster management are to protect animal health and welfare, safeguard human and environmental health and assist Member Countries in restoring and enhancing economic and societal conditions.

Various disaster management models are available to provide a framework to develop disaster management programmes, actions, and activities. A simple, commonly used DMC model has been selected in order to illustrate the phases of disease that must be addressed.

The DMC phases include: mitigation and prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Disaster management programmes often focus on response, but effective disaster management includes activities in all four phases.

*Mitigation* means ‘the lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters’. (UNISDR, 2015)


*Prevention* means ‘any action aimed at reducing risks or mitigating adverse consequences of a disaster for people, the environment and property, including cultural heritage’. (EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 2013)

*Preparedness* means ‘a state of readiness and capability of human and material means, structures, communities and organisations enabling them to ensure an effective rapid response to a disaster, obtained as a result of action taken in advance’. (EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 2013)

*Response* means ‘the provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected’. (UNISDR, 2015)

*Recovery* means ‘the restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors’. (UNISDR, 2015)

The Disaster Management Cycle is shown below.



**Figure 1. Phases of the Disaster Management Cycle**

The four phases of the DMC are used as a framework to plan and organise the processes, policies and

procedures involved in disaster management, including disaster risk reduction. The phases are not always distinct, but flow into one another in a continuous cycle. In a specific disaster event, different agencies may be in different phases of the DMC. Using this common framework will assist Veterinary Services to align their activities with other governmental and non-governmental actors.

There are certain elements that should always be considered as they are common to all four phases of the DMC. These include: legislation and regulatory authority, budgeting and resourcing, internal and external communications (processes and infrastructure), training and education, information technology and knowledge management, and integration and coordination with other agencies, organisations and stakeholders.

## 2.1 MITIGATION AND PREVENTION

Mitigation and prevention activities occur prior to disaster events and they incorporate lessons learned from the response and recovery phases of previous disasters.

Most countries already have a National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan which has been developed at central level and which explains the roles and responsibilities of all government and non-government services in the case of disasters. Veterinary Services should be involved in the preparation or review of these National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans. Veterinary Services should involve all internal units in the preparation and review of the plan and consider the roles and responsibilities of actors such as farmers, animal owners, pharmaceutical industries, the food industry, feed producers, traders, slaughterhouses, laboratories, transportation and border control authorities, national governments, intergovernmental bodies, non-governmental organisations and private voluntary associations.

### EU comment

**The EU asks the OIE to consider amending the third sentence in the above paragraph:**

**"Veterinary Services should involve all internal units in the preparation and review of the plan and consider the roles and responsibilities of actors such as farmers, animal owners and keepers, private veterinarians, pharmaceutical industries ..."**

### Justification:

**Many times the person responsible for an animal is not the owner but the keeper therefore both should be mentioned in this context.**

**Private veterinarians can play a key role in disaster management as they have first-hand contact with animal owners and skills which can help during all stages of disaster management.**

### EU comment

**The EU asks the OIE to consider including the following new paragraph:**

**"Embedding contingency planning within sector specific guidance is an important tool for contingency planning."**


### Justification:

**A selection of guidance is available for different sectors such as breeding of animals, farming of animals etc. It would be useful to include a section to cover preparedness for disasters to raise awareness within their sector and heighten mitigation and prevention levels.**

Veterinary Services should establish their own National Veterinary Service Disaster and Risk Reduction Plan.



Figure 2 illustrates how Veterinary Services Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans are nested within international and national guidelines and plans and how they are linked to private-sector plans.



**Figure 2. Relationship of Multi-sectoral Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans and Guidelines**

#### **EU comment**

**The EU would ask the OIE to consider including a fourth box within level 2, directly underneath “Private Sector’s Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans”:**

**“Premise or farm level Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans.”**

#### **Justification:**

**In the same way that there are National and Local disaster plans, the private sector may have a sector specific plan as well as local/on farm individual plans.**

**The EU would also like to highlight that Figure 2 seems to indicate that Private Sector’s plans are separate from national and regional plans, however this is not always necessarily the case as national/local plans could include and take into account private sector’s plans.**

The National Veterinary Services Disaster and Risk Reduction Plan, which should be developed during the mitigation and prevention phase, should cover all four phases of the DMC. The plan will include the following chapters:

#### **2.1.1 Veterinary Services and Other Stakeholders: Roles, Responsibilities, Cooperation and Collaboration**

Central Government typically plays the lead role in preparing for and responding to disasters. The roles and responsibilities of the Veterinary Services should be clearly laid out and mechanisms for interaction with other Services and Ministries should be described.

The Veterinary Services will play a leadership role in advising the authorities on animal health, welfare and veterinary public health in disaster situations. The Veterinary Services should provide sufficient and appropriate input to ensure policies governing support for animals in disaster situations are effective.

The involvement of private veterinarians in all phases of the disaster management cycle is important as a primary link for producers and other animal owners. The roles and responsibilities of private veterinarians, livestock owners, producers, and other animal owners should also be described in the plan and, where relevant, they should receive appropriate training from Veterinary Services or other appropriate entities. Veterinary Services should support the development of disaster management plans by advising other actors as appropriate.

#### **EU comment**

**The EU asks the OIE to consider amending slightly the second sentence in the above paragraph:**

**"The roles and responsibilities of private veterinarians, livestock owners, producers, and other animal owners and keepers should also be described in the plan and, where relevant, ..."**

#### **Justification:**

**Many times the person responsible for an animal is not the owner but the keeper therefore both should be mentioned in this context.**

#### **2.1.2 Legal Framework, Legislation**

The plan should follow existing international frameworks where appropriate, such as the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (HFA) and the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction of the United Nations (UNISDR). The plan should be harmonised with the national legislation for disaster management and make provision for interaction between official and private institutions and organisations. Veterinary Services should include their mitigation and prevention activities in national and regional plans and harmonise them with those of other sectors and the government. When Veterinary Services lack established legal authority for action in disaster situations, specific requirements should be identified and new legislation developed to address the gaps.

#### **2.1.3 Communication and Public Awareness**

A clear communication strategy is central to the plan. The strategy should involve communication at all levels from government level to the general public. Prior agreements on communication responsibilities are essential to avoid any conflicting information. Communication should focus on transparency, listening, and responding, and will aim to build trust and distribute appropriate messages in a timely manner.

Communication is a two-way process, so communication tools, technologies, procedures and templates should be available for communication between central units and the field operational level, including field-based veterinarians, animal owners, and the general public. Communication should take into consideration the social and cultural aspects of content delivery to maximise effectiveness.

Public awareness campaigns in the mitigation and prevention phase help to maintain vigilance against disaster risks and improve the self-preparedness of animal owners. Making animal owners aware of their options in the case of disaster is a vital part of efficient disaster cycle management.

#### **2.1.4 Annex VII (contd) Risk Analyses**

#### **EU comment**

**Typographical error in the heading needs to be corrected:**

**"Analysis"**

Risk analysis means the overall cross-sectoral process of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication undertaken at national or appropriate sub-national level. Conducting a risk analysis prior to a disaster will enable stakeholders to prioritise

investments for disaster risk-reduction activities and facilitate the decision process within the whole disaster management cycle. The risk analysis should include hazard identification and hazard mapping, risk assessment, vulnerability analysis, capacity analysis, risk evaluation, and risk communication.

#### **2.1.5 Structure of Veterinary Services**

The structure of Veterinary Services varies from one country to another and risks will vary from one region to another within the country. The plan should address regional specificities and address whether or not capacities are available for response within regions.

Response to disasters requires the ability to make quick evidence-based decisions and to convert those decisions into clear orders which can be conveyed down a very clear chain of command to those who are charged with the responsibility to carry them out. This requires the Veterinary Services in a country to be part of a well-defined command structure or line management system, at least for the duration of the emergency. This command system may differ from the structure in place for routine work and should be described in the National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan.

All key staff in both central and decentralised offices should have a detailed job description defining their roles and responsibilities during all phases of the DMC, including mitigation and prevention.

#### **2.1.6 Human Resources**

Different skills will be required during all phases of the DMC. It is important to provide on-the-job training, invest in early warning activities, and to provide for increasing the capacity of Veterinary Services for emergency responses.

#### **2.1.7 Financing**

Finances should be available without delay during the preparedness and response phases. Budgeting for interventions and identifying sources of funding in advance will allow for rapid action. Budgets should include both contingency funds and funds for ongoing risk-reduction activities (such as education/training, biosecurity, surveillance activities, maintenance of early warning systems)

#### **2.1.8 Early Warning Systems, Surveillance Systems**

Veterinary Services have the duty and responsibility to ensure that disease surveillance and livestock-related information is integrated into early warning systems and they should be actively engaged in their development. Veterinary Services need to engage with other governmental agencies so that any warning information regarding all types of hazards can be received and effectively disseminated.

#### **2.1.9 Contingency Plans and Standard Operating Procedures**

Contingency planning means a management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations. (EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 2013)

Veterinary Services should develop contingency plans for each type of event identified during risk assessment exercises using an all-hazards approach. The plans should cover natural disasters (e.g. flooding, hurricanes, wind storms, drought, earthquakes, extreme cold, volcano eruptions, transboundary epizootics and pandemics) and man-made technological disasters (e.g. chemical release, radiologic accidents, oil spills, explosions, conflict and bioterrorism). Contingency plans cover sets of activities carried out as part of the response and recovery phases of the DMC. They comprise both long-term measures and measures implemented in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. There should be contingency plans for responding to animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health needs during natural and man-made disasters, including disease outbreaks. These contingency plans will be specific to each type of event: a flood, for example, will require a different contingency plan from a disease outbreak. Moreover, different disease types may require different contingency plans.

**EU comment**

The EU asks the OIE to consider amending the first and second sentences of the above paragraph as follows:

**"Veterinary Services should develop one or more contingency plans for which can cover each type of event identified during risk assessment exercises using an all-hazards approach. The plans should cover natural disasters (e.g. flooding, hurricanes, wind storms, drought, earthquakes, extreme cold, volcano eruptions, transboundary epizootics and pandemics) and man-made or technological disasters (e.g. chemical release, radiologic accidents, oil spills, loss of power or technological failure, transport problems, explosions, conflict and bioterrorism)."**

**Justification:**

It is likely that most disaster types can be managed under a generic framework and it may not be necessary to create a separate plan for each specific disaster. A framework can provide a helpful platform for several types of incidents. Whilst following a step by step approach might be ideal there may not always be the time or resource to start from a generic plan and tested models might provide a better solution where pressed.

Many farms are dependent on power and technological advances to supply basic animal needs such as food or adequate temperature. Equally transporting animals by road, rail, air or sea can create a number of welfare issues. In the event of an accident, animals might be injured or they might escape and stray onto roads or railway lines. If animals cannot be moved, particularly in hot weather, their needs must still be catered for.

**Reference**

**Opinion on Contingency Planning for Farm Animal Welfare in Disasters and Emergencies**

**March 2012**

The process of developing a contingency plan provides valuable learning that helps successful implementation of the plan when a disaster occurs. It involves organising a team representing relevant authorities and stakeholders, identifying critical resources and functions, and establishing a plan for recovery beyond response (see under Preparedness).

To ensure the quality of the contingency plans, Veterinary services should develop standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for interventions that regularly recur during the preparedness and response phases.

The mitigation and prevention phase includes much more than just contingency plans. Mitigation and prevention requires ongoing capacity development, continuous monitoring and surveillance, and regular updating of risk analyses and risk reduction activities.

All activities included in the Veterinary Services Disaster and Risk Reduction Plan should be periodically reviewed and updated.

**2.2 PREPAREDNESS**

The preparedness phase often begins when warning of an impending disaster is received. Veterinary Services should get ready to activate their relevant contingency plans so that they are prepared for the foreseeable consequences as the disaster progresses. The implementation of contingency plans requires flexibility and adjustments according to the magnitude and circumstances of the disaster.

Relevant contingency plans should be put together by the Veterinary Authority in conjunction with representatives from the national and local governments, non-governmental organisations and relevant private-sector stakeholders. The contingency plans will include:

#### **EU comment**

**The EU would like to suggest amending the final sentence of the above paragraph as follows:**

**"The contingency plans should take into account previous gap analysis and will include:"**

#### **Justification:**

**Whilst the text includes gap analysis during later disaster stages in reality the time between the start of an event and the beginning of recovery may not be very long – in the order of hours to 1-2 days. It is unlikely that a detailed gap analysis could be undertaken in this time alongside everything else, although this could be one of the actions within the Recovery Plan.**

**It is thus essential when establishing contingency plans to take into account previous experiences and the outcome of the gap analysis then.**

- Details of the types of disaster covered by the plan
- Systems for rapid assessment and situation awareness
- Legislation
- Established chain of command system
- Plans for coordination with other relevant governmental agencies, inter-governmental agencies, NGOs and private sector
- Finance arrangements (including compensation policy)
- Human resource plan
- Communication plan & public awareness measures
- Established sustainable continuity plan & recovery plan

During the preparedness phase, Veterinary Services will switch to emergency mode and start implementing the relevant command system, as described in the Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan, to maximise the response capacity and use early warning systems to communicate with relevant parties. Early in the preparedness phase the Veterinary Services will review the availability of human and financial resources as well as tailor the communication strategy to the specific disaster event.

## **2.3 RESPONSE**

### **2.3.1 Implementation of National Veterinary Services' Contingency Plans**

Impact assessment and situation awareness are the first steps to be taken following the activation of any contingency plan. The impact of the disaster on the Veterinary Services themselves and their capacity to implement the plan should be assessed. Veterinary Services need to prioritise activities in conjunction with key stakeholders. They must remain flexible and undertake appropriate action after an assessment of the impact on the health and welfare of animals, human safety and the environment. If there is no specific contingency plan for the type of disaster that is taking place, Veterinary Services should take a step-by-step approach to decision-making and refer to the contents described in the mitigation and prevention and preparedness phases of the contingency plans they have developed for generic guidance.

#### **EU comment**

**The EU asks the OIE to consider the following amendment to the final sentence in the above paragraph:**

**"If there is no specific contingency plan for the type of disaster that is taking place, and**

**the existing one cannot be used nor adapted to deal with the disaster that is taking place**  
**the Veterinary Services should take a step-by-step approach to decision-making and refer to the contents described in the mitigation and prevention and preparedness phases of the contingency plans they have developed for generic guidance."**

**Justification:**

**It is likely that most disasters can be managed under a generic framework and it may not be necessary to create a separate plan for each specific disaster. A framework can provide a helpful platform for several types of incidents. Whilst following a step by step approach might be ideal there may not always be the time or resource to start from a generic plan and tested models might provide a better solution where pressed.**

### **2.3.2 Governance**

Each contingency plan (developed in the mitigation/prevention phase) will determine governance and the chain of command. Cooperation and coordination with stakeholders under clear lines of responsibility will be important to expand the capacity of Veterinary Services. Adaptability, efficiency, and continuity of support are critical to effective response.

### **2.3.3 Legislation activity**

Contingency plans will be based on existing legislation that will enable immediate action. Emergency management ordinances and specific regulations may be issued when required.

### **2.3.4 Communication**

Appropriate communication is critical for good governance, knowledge management and contingency planning. Veterinary Services should have detailed internal and external communication plans within their contingency plans.

### **2.3.5 Gap Analysis**

Following an assessment of the impact of the disaster on the Veterinary Services themselves, a gap analysis should be carried out to identify Veterinary Services needs. All relevant stakeholders must be included so that all significant issues are identified and addressed. Gap analysis should also take into account what will be required during the recovery phase and consider whether some earlier risk mitigation actions could avoid some of those recovery needs.

## **2.4 RECOVERY**

### **2.4.1 Recovery Plan**

Following gap analysis during the response phase, a recovery plan should be developed in order to detail human and material resource requirements, and the related budget. After identifying gaps within Veterinary Services, and after further consultation with key stakeholders, Veterinary Services should evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of their response to the disaster. The development of a recovery plan should include opportunities to 'build back better' (i.e. provide greater resilience) and should be multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary where applicable. The plan should include monitoring and evaluation.

### **2.4.2 Governance**

In the recovery phase, consideration should also be given as to how the Veterinary Services will continue to undertake their ongoing operations or 'business as usual'. This may require areas of governance to be reconsidered dependent upon current resources, and may even require changes to some aspects of legislation.

### 2.4.3 Communication

High-quality communication is necessary to keep all relevant stakeholders aware of developments. Failures in communication may result in stakeholders not giving input to vital areas of recovery and reconstruction, and may result in a lack of adequate resourcing and funding to ensure a successful recovery phase. The most significant stakeholders to be considered throughout both the response and recovery phases are the affected community. Community engagement will increase buy-in and speed up recovery from the disaster.

### 2.4.4 Gap Analysis

The recovery plan should identify the most probable recovery needs of the disaster and these should inform subsequent contingency plans. Veterinary Services should consider the different needs of both rural and urban communities, which are likely to include support for managing the consequences of livestock and production losses, companion animal displacement, and infrastructure loss. Veterinary Services should also consider how severely their buildings and facilities have been impacted and plan for their replacement during the recovery phase. These plans should take into account lag times for construction materials to be available and for key services, such as water and electricity supplies, to be reconnected.

Monitoring and evaluating the successes and failures of the recovery plan will identify both resource and process gaps. Like gap analysis from the response phase, gap analysis of the recovery phase may also identify areas for improvement in the mitigation phase.

## 2.5 TOPICS RELEVANT TO ALL DMC PHASES

### 2.5.1 Legislative framework

The National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan should be supported by effective legislation at each level of government. Member Countries are encouraged to follow the OIE standards on veterinary legislation as described in Chapter 3.4. of the *Terrestrial Code*. It is recommended that Veterinary Services review and analyse current legislation and engage in developing appropriate legislation to support animal health, animal welfare, and veterinary public health activities in disasters within the framework of disaster management and disaster risk reduction contingency plans.

### 2.5.2 Communications

Effective communication is essential throughout the DMC. There must be effective communication both within the Veterinary Services and between Veterinary Services and other stakeholders, i.e. other government departments, non-government stakeholders and the public. Veterinary Services should consider developing pre-scripted communications that can be modified for use in the preparedness and response phases. Veterinary Services are encouraged to incorporate disaster management communications in accordance with Chapter 3.3 'Communication' of the *Terrestrial Code*.

#### EU comment

The EU asks the OIE to consider inserting a new third sentence in the above paragraph:

**"Communication plans should suggest alternative pathways for communications as telephone or electricity supply lines may be down."**

#### Justification:

**Depending on the circumstances of the disaster, ordinary communication channels may not be in operation due to e.g. total power failure. This should be highlighted as any plan needs to envisage alternative pathways so as to maintain a good communication.**

### 2.5.3 Training and Education

Training and education are necessary to prepare Veterinary Services to execute their responsibilities during disasters. Technical training is essential, and should be supplemented with training on organisational and operational aspects of disaster management, including

inter-agency (inter-ministry) and inter-sectoral collaboration. Disaster management training should be included in veterinary education and in training courses for private-sector stakeholders.

#### 2.5.4 Information Technology and Knowledge Management

Information technology and knowledge management capacity should be developed in order to maintain awareness of the activities of Veterinary Services and to facilitate information sharing with other government and non-government stakeholders throughout the DMC.

#### 2.5.5 Integration and Coordination

For nearly all disasters, Veterinary Service disaster programmes will have to be incorporated into higher-level governmental frameworks for national disaster response. In addition, Veterinary Services should establish programmes and processes to coordinate their activities with non-governmental and public stakeholders.

#### EU comment

**The EU asks the OIE to consider introducing a new additional point at the end of section 2.5:**

#### **"2.5.6 Lessons learned**

**To enable a thorough lessons learned exercise post-incident it is crucial that issues are captured during all the different stages of the disaster. Enabling a systematic capture approach during incidents would facilitate and maximise the benefits of lessons learned exercises."**

#### **Justification:**

**Whilst lessons learned are covered under 2.1 as a key part of disaster plan preparation this is not captured in the different phases of the disaster plan. Given that this is a cross-cutting element which should be considered throughout the disaster management we suggest that lessons learned is recognised as a key task under the topics relevant to all DCM phases. Within the UK experience the post-incident review and lessons learned exercises of emergencies have been critical in enhancing future response and in identifying areas for improvement, an example of this is the Pitt Report published in the UK following the flooding of 2007. This report culminated in 92 recommendations covering prediction and warning of flooding, prevention, emergency management, resilience and recovery.**

#### **References:**

**Learning lessons from the 2007 floods – The Pitt review. Published in June 2008**

## 2.6 CONCLUSION

Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction programmes should be dynamic and in a continual process of development as hazards, technologies, legislation and standards evolve. Applying internationally accepted guidelines and standards adopted by national and regional authorities will allow Veterinary Service to provide efficient and effective programmes. Critical to success will be risk analysis; planning; training; resource allocation; integration and coordination with government; cooperation with private-sector and non-governmental stakeholders; and disaster simulation exercises. Prioritising risk reduction is vital to avoiding or successfully responding to future disasters.

#### EU comment



The EU would suggest inserting a new second sentence and to amend the second from last sentence so that paragraph reads:

**"Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction programmes should be dynamic and in a continual process of development as hazards, technologies, legislation and standards evolve. Plans should cover public health, animal health and animal welfare aspects during all stages of the disaster. Applying internationally accepted guidelines and standards adopted by national and regional authorities will allow Veterinary Service to provide efficient and effective programmes. Critical to success will be risk analysis; planning; training; resource allocation; communication, integration and coordination with government; cooperation with private-sector and non-governmental stakeholders; and disaster simulation exercises. Prioritising risk reduction is vital to avoiding or successfully responding to future disasters."**

**Justification:**

Whilst the title refers to these three pillars it is important that the chapter text also emphasizes that all three aspects should be considered in all the different stages of the disaster plans.

Communication is also a critical part of the plans and should be included here.

### **3. DISASTER MANAGEMENT TOOLBOX OF RESOURCES**

#### **International Guidelines and Standards**

- The LEGS Project. 2014. Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards, 2nd edition. Practical Action Publishing, Rugby, UK.
- FAO. 2011. Good Emergency Management Practices: The Essentials. Edited by Nick Honhold, Ian Douglas, William Geering, Arnon Shimshoni and Juan Lubroth. FAO Animal Production and Health Manual No.11. Rome
- United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.  
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015  
<http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/1037>
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
Response and Contingency Planning Guide  
<http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/40825/1220900-CPG%202012-EN-LR.pdf>  
2007CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. [www.ifrc.org](http://www.ifrc.org)

#### **EU comment**

The EU would suggest including also the following agency in the above overview, including also the work done by them:

#### **"International Atomic Energy Agency**

**Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (Safety Requirements, Safety Guides, Criteria for Use)**

**including future revisions that will reflect lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident"**

<http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/documents/general.asp>

**Justification:**

**There have been major events with nuclear fallout and impacts on animals have been observed. It would thus be useful to include the IAEA texts on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. So far these texts have not been updated with the lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster, although the IAEA stated in 2011 that they would do so.**

**Additional Resources**

United National High Commissioner for Refugees

Livestock Keeping and Animal Husbandry in Refugee and Returnee Situations  
Environment, Technical Support Section, UNHCR Geneva and IUCN, 2005

United States Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA Online training

<http://training.fema.gov/is/nims.aspx>

**References**

1. UNISDR. 2015. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction –<http://www.unisdr.org>
2. IFRC. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies –<http://www.ifrc.org/en/>
3. EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Decision No. 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism Text with EEA relevance.

---

**Proposed strategy for the use of the Guidelines and future work**

- a. Incorporate Guideline elements where appropriate into the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*
- b. Incorporate Guidelines into the PVS programme
- c. Convene a Global Conference on Animals in Disasters

- d. Identify and engage strategic partners in Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction activities
  - e. Market the Guidelines through presentations in appropriate venues
  - f. Consider incorporating animal health and welfare, veterinary public health and bioterrorism into the OIE Day One competency curriculum
  - g. Publish a Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction issue of the OIE *Scientific and Technical Review*
  - h. Support the creation of a Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction OIE Collaborating Centre in each OIE region
  - i. Survey OIE regions on current status of authorities and capabilities in Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction
  - j. Incorporate Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction into Focal Point training
  - k. Develop and maintain a web-based reference resource for Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction
-

UNOFFICIAL VERSION

---

© World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), 2015

This document has been prepared by specialists convened by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Pending adoption by the World Assembly of Delegates, the views expressed herein can only be construed as those of these specialists.

All OIE publications are protected by international copyright law. Extracts may be copied, reproduced, translated, adapted or published in journals, documents, books, electronic media and any other medium destined for the public, for information, educational or commercial purposes, provided prior written permission has been granted by the OIE.

The designations and denominations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the OIE concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries.

The views expressed in signed articles are solely the responsibility of the authors. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by the OIE in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

**MODEL VETERINARY CERTIFICATE**  
**FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF NOT MORE THAN 90 DAYS**  
**OF A HIGH HEALTH-HIGH PERFORMANCE HORSE FOR COMPETITION OR RACES**

**EU comment**

**The EU thanks the OIE for having taken some of its previous comments into account and in general supports this model veterinary certificate. Important previous comments are inserted again in the text below for consideration by the ad hoc group, as well as further specific comments.**

Certificate number: .....

Import permit number (if applicable): ..... issued by  
 ..... (insert name of government authority) of  
 ..... (insert name of country of destination)

This certificate is issued for a High Health-High Performance (HHP) horse

- dispatched from the country of usual residence to a country of temporary residence<sup>1</sup>
- dispatched from a country of temporary residence to another country of temporary residence<sup>1</sup>
- returning from a country of temporary residence to the country of usual residence<sup>1</sup>

Numbers of attached reference certificates (if applicable): .....

Movement from: ..... Movement to: ..... Ref cert no: .....

Movement from: ..... Movement to: ..... Ref cert no: .....

Movement from: ..... Movement to: ..... Ref cert no: .....

Movement from: ..... Movement to: ..... Ref cert no: .....

**I. IDENTIFICATION OF THE HORSE**

I.1. Name: .....

I.2. Colour: .....

I.3. Sex: .....

I.4. Microchip number: ..... Reading system other than ISO: .....

**EU comment**

**The EU notes that, in line with the provisions of Chapters 4.1. and 4.2. of the Terrestrial Code, the Code Chapter on High Health Status Horse Subpopulations in its Article 4.16.2.**

<sup>1</sup> Select as appropriate.

point 2a) requires that horses in that subpopulation be individually and permanently identified. According to that Article, the use of microchips as a means of permanent identification of said horses is only an option, albeit the preferred one. Therefore, other means of identification are possible. For reasons of consistency with Chapter 4.16. of the Code, there should thus be an option in the certificate for stating an alternative permanent unique identifier (i.e. branding or tattoo), in addition to the reference to the microchip number in point I.4. above, as follows:

**"I.4.bis. Alternative permanent unique identifier (if an identifier other than a microchip is used): ....."**.

Furthermore, to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be clarified that the UELN in point I.5. below does not represent such an alternative permanent unique identifier as referred to in Article 4.16.2. point 2a). Indeed, as the UELN is based on the national zootechnical registration number and is not physically linked to the horse, it does not constitute a physical identifier and thus cannot serve traceability purposes. The EU understands that the UELN's inclusion in the certificate, in addition to the permanent unique identifier, is useful as it serves the zootechnical records of HHP horses, however this should not lead to a possible confusion with the permanent unique identifier of the horse. Therefore, the EU suggests inserting a footnote in point I.5. below, as follows:

**"I.5. Universal Equine Life Number (UELN<sup>x</sup>): ....**

**x The UELN is an international zootechnical number composed of the country and national database codes and the national stud-book registration number of the horse, and does not constitute a unique permanent identifier as referred to in I.4. and I.4.bis."**

I.5. Universal Equine Life Number (UELN): .....

I.6. HHP<sup>2</sup> identification number: .....

I.7. Number of accompanying passport:.....

issued by .....  
(insert authority that issued the passport)

## II. ORIGIN OF THE HORSE

II.1. Country of dispatch: .....

II.2. Name and address of consignor: .....

<sup>3</sup>II.3. Address and registration number of the premises of dispatch in the country of usual residence:

<sup>3</sup>II.3. Address and registration number of the premises of dispatch in the country of temporary residence:

<sup>2</sup> The number attributed to the High Health-High Performance horse by the Fédération Equestre Internationale or the International Federation of Horseracing Authorities.

<sup>3</sup> Select one of the options and delete the option(s) not applicable.

### III. DESTINATION OF THE HORSE

III.1. Country of destination: .....

III.2. Name and address of consignee: .....

<sup>3</sup>III.3. Address and registration number of the premises of destination in the country of temporary residence:

.....  
 .....

<sup>3</sup>III.3. Address and registration number of the premises of destination in the country of usual residence:

.....  
 .....

### IV. TRANSPORT INFORMATION

Identification of transport: AEROPLANE (type of aircraft and flight number)<sup>4</sup> / VEHICLE (registration number)<sup>4</sup> / SHIP (name or registration number)<sup>4</sup>

.....

### V. DECLARATION BY THE CERTIFYING OFFICIAL VETERINARIAN

I, the undersigned official veterinarian, hereby certify that the horse described above:

V.1. has been examined today, this being within 48 hours prior to dispatch, and found free from clinical signs of infectious or contagious disease, free from obvious signs of ectoparasitic infestation and fit to travel the intended journey;

V.2. is a registered HHP horse accompanied by its passport in which all vaccinations related to this certificate are documented;

V.3. has during the 90 days prior to qualification as an HHP horse and during the period of registration as a HHP horse not been used for natural or artificial reproduction and has not been kept on premises where natural or artificial reproduction activities are carried out;

#### EU comment

**The point above implies that the horse has been registered as an HHP horse at some point, and that a period of 90 days prior to that registration is also covered by this declaration pertaining to non-reproduction activities. However, the precise date of registration as an HHP horse by the FEI or IFHA is neither to be indicated in the certificate nor in the owner declaration. Therefore, the EU suggests including that date of registration in the certificate, and including a declaration relating to non-reproduction activities during the 90 days prior to the date of registration as an HHP horse in the owner declaration.**

**Furthermore, the word "qualification" in point V.3. is unclear, and should preferably be replaced by "registration".**

<sup>4</sup> Select the appropriate options and delete those not applicable.

- V.4. since HHP registration has not come into contact with any horse that was not a horse belonging to a high health status subpopulation and has originated from registered premises<sup>4</sup> and has been resident on HHP registered premises throughout its travel period
- V.5. has not visited premises in the country of dispatch under official restriction for health reasons;

**EU comment**

**The point above seems a bit vague. The EU therefore suggests clarifying to which diseases these official restrictions pertain, as e.g. diseases to which horses are not susceptible should not be relevant, and the time frame for this requirement. Furthermore, in order to certify that point, the veterinarian would need a list of premises of residence during that time frame; this should be made available via the owner declaration.**

**Furthermore, this point raises the question of how the high health status horse subpopulation is handled if a registered premises comes under official restrictions.**

- V.6. to the best of my knowledge for at least 15 days prior to certification has not come into contact with animals showing signs of infectious or contagious disease;

**EU comment**

**The EU notes that points V.3. to V.6. above will be difficult for the official veterinarian to certify. The EU suggests that these points be certified on the basis of and with reference to an owner declaration; these points should therefore also be included in section VIII.**

**The EU thus suggests preceding points V.3. to V.6. by the following sentence:**

**"I have received a declaration from the owner/designated person responsible for the HHP horse stating that the horse described above:"**

**Alternatively, point V.6. could be covered solely by the owner declaration (and deleted from section V.).**

- V.7. comes from the country of dispatch in which the following diseases are compulsorily notifiable: African horse sickness, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, eastern equine encephalomyelitis, western equine encephalomyelitis, Japanese encephalitis, equine infectious anaemia, glanders (*Burkholderia mallei*) and rabies;
- V.8. comes from the country of dispatch, which:
- <sup>3</sup>*either* [V.8.1. is officially free from African horse sickness in accordance with the requirements of the OIE;]
- <sup>3</sup>*or* [V.8.1. is not officially free from African horse sickness in accordance with the requirements of the OIE, and the horse was not vaccinated within 40 days prior to the introduction into an approved vector protected quarantine station where it was isolated for at least 14 days and has been subjected to a validated PCR test carried out with negative results on samples taken on two occasions on .....<sup>5</sup> and on .....<sup>5</sup>, the first sample been taken immediately prior to or on entry into the quarantine station and the second sample been taken within 48 hrs prior to direct vector protected transport from the quarantine station to the place of dispatch;]
- <sup>3</sup>*either* [V.8.2. has been free of Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis for at least the last two years;]
- <sup>3</sup>*or* [V.8.2. has not been free of Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis for at least the last two years, and the horse was:
- <sup>3</sup>*either* [V.8.2.1. vaccinated with a registered inactivated vaccine against Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions at least 60 days prior to dispatch;]]



- <sup>3</sup> or [V.8.2.1. during the three weeks prior to dispatch kept under vector protection at all times and was subjected to a haemagglutination inhibition test for Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis carried out on .....<sup>5</sup> on paired samples taken on .....<sup>5</sup> and on .....<sup>5</sup>, at least 14 days apart, with either negative results or a stable or declining titre, the second sample been taken within 7 days of direct vector protected transport to the place of dispatch;]]

And appropriate vector protection is applied during transportation

- <sup>3</sup> either [V.8.3. is the country of usual residence and is free from glanders for at least 3 years, and the horse was subjected to a complement fixation test for glanders carried out with negative result at a serum dilution of 1 in 5 on a sample taken on .....<sup>5</sup> during the 30 days prior to dispatch;]

- <sup>3</sup> or [V.8.3. is the country of usual residence and is not known to be free from glanders for at least 3 years, and the horse has been permanently resident for at least 3 weeks prior to dispatch on a single establishment free of glanders for at least the past 6 months and has been subjected to a complement fixation test for glanders carried out with negative results at a serum dilution of 1 in 5 on samples taken on two occasions on .....<sup>5</sup> and on .....<sup>5</sup>, at least 21 days apart, the second sample been taken within 10 days of dispatch;]

- <sup>3</sup> or [V.8.3. is the country of temporary residence, and the horse was kept on premises which have been free from glanders for at least 6 months;]

- <sup>3</sup> either [V.9. has been subjected to the indirect fluorescent antibody test (IFAT) or the competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (c-ELISA) for equine piroplasmosis (*Babesia caballi* and *Theileria equi*) carried out with negative results on a sample taken on .....<sup>5</sup> within 14 days of dispatch;]

- <sup>3</sup> or [V.9. has previously been subjected to the indirect fluorescent antibody test (IFAT) or the competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (c-ELISA) for equine piroplasmosis (*Babesia caballi* and *Theileria equi*) carried out with positive result and does not show clinical signs of piroplasmosis on the day of examination and has been examined and treated against ticks during the 7 days prior to dispatch;]

- V.10. has been subjected to an agar gel immunodiffusion test for equine infectious anaemia carried out with negative result on a sample taken on .....<sup>5</sup> within 120 days of dispatch;

- V.11. has been vaccinated against equine influenza within 21 to 90 days of dispatch with either two consecutive inoculations with the same vaccine given 21 to 42 days apart on .....<sup>5</sup> and on .....<sup>5</sup> or with a booster given on .....<sup>5</sup> at least on an annual basis after a primary course;

- V.12. was found free from external parasites following a systematic and thorough examination in particular of ears, false nostrils, intermandibular space, mane, lower body areas, including axillae, groin, and the perineum and tail, and was treated within 48 hours of dispatch with a broad spectrum parasiticide licensed or registered for use on horses according to the manufacturer's recommendations.

## VI. TRANSPORT CONDITIONS

After due enquiry and to the best of my knowledge the transport of the horse has been arranged to ensure that:

- VI.1. the horse is consigned directly from the premises of dispatch to the premises of destination;
- VI.2. during transport to destination the horse will not come into contact with horses that have no current HHP registration;

- VI.3. the vehicle in which horse is being transported has been cleansed and disinfected prior to embarkation with a disinfectant approved in the country of dispatch. The vehicle has been designed to prevent the escape of droppings, litter or fodder during transportation;
- VI.4. during transport to destination the health and welfare of the horse will be protected effectively.

#### EU comment

The EU notes that point VI. above will be difficult for the official veterinarian to certify. Indeed, points VI.2. and VI.4. relate to events taking place in the future and are therefore out of the control of the certifying veterinarian. Reference is made to Chapter 5.2., more particularly the second paragraph of Article 5.2.1. Therefore, the limitation conferred by the words "has been arranged to ensure that" is very important, but should be specified further, e.g. by a clear reference to the owner declaration in section VIII, as follows:

**"After due enquiry and to the best of my knowledge, and after having received a declaration from the owner/designated person responsible for the HHP horse to that effect, the transport of the horse has been arranged to ensure that:"**

Furthermore, the EU suggests only keeping points VI.1. and VI.3. (modified as suggested below) in part VI., and transferring points VI.2. and VI.4. to section VIII. (i.e. the declaration being signed by the owner).

#### VII. AUTHENTICATION OF CERTIFICATE

This certificate is valid for 10 days from the date of signature.

The declaration signed by the owner or person responsible for the horse is part of this certificate.

Name in capitals of official veterinarian: .....

Position: .....

Office address: .....

Telephone: ..... Fax: .....

Email address: .....

Signature:

Date: ..... Place: .....

Official stamp:

## Appendix XXIX (contd)

**VIII. DECLARATION TO BE SIGNED BY THE OWNER OR DESIGNATED PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HORSE**

I, the undersigned, ..... (insert name in capitals) declare:

1. The horse described in this veterinary certificate, will be outside its country of usual residence for not more than 90 days.
2. Since the current registration as HHP horse, the horse has not been in direct contact with horses that did not have a current HHP registration.
3. The horse has
  - resided in ..... (country of usual residence) since .....<sup>5</sup>
  - entered ..... (country of temporary residence) ON .....<sup>5</sup>
4. During its temporary stay in the country of dispatch the horse has been kept only in the following premises that contain only HHP horses and are under supervision of the veterinary authority of that country:

Address of premises	Date of entry	Date of exit

5. The horse will be sent directly from the premises of dispatch to the premises of destination under conditions that ensure it will not come into contact with horses other than those that have current HHP registration, accompanied by the required veterinary health certificate, in a vehicle that was cleansed and disinfected in advance with a disinfectant approved in the country of dispatch.

Date: ..... Place: .....

Signature:

**EU comment**

**As indicated in the EU comments on sections V and VI above, the owner declaration should be expanded to cover points V.3. to V.6. and VI.2. to VI.4.**

**Furthermore, an additional point should be added to indicate that the owner declares that he/she will do everything in his/her power to prevent contact with non high health subpopulation horses and other equids, as well as to protect the health and welfare of the HHP horse.**

<sup>5</sup> Insert date

## CHAPTER 15.1.

**INFECTIO WITH AFRICAN SWINE FEVER VIRUS****EU comment**

**The EU in general supports the proposed changes to this chapter. Comments are inserted in the text below.**

## Article 15.1.1.

**General provisions**

The Suids (the pig and its close relatives) are the only natural hosts for African swine fever virus (ASFV). These include all varieties of *Sus scrofa*, both domestic and wild, warthogs (*Phacochoerus* spp.), bushpigs (*Potamochoerus* spp.) and giant forest hog (*Hylochoerus meinertzhageni*).

For the purposes of this chapter, a distinction is made among between: domestic pigs (permanently captive and farmed free range pigs) and wild pigs (including feral pigs and wild boar) as well as between *Sus scrofa* and African pig species.

= domestic and captive wild pigs, permanently captive or farmed free range, used for the production of meat, or other commercial products or use, or for breeding these categories of pigs;

= wild and feral pigs;

= African wild suid species.

All varieties of *Sus scrofa* are susceptible to the pathogenic effects of ASFV, while the African wild suids pigs are not and may act as reservoirs of the virus infection. Ticks of the genus *Ornithodoros* are natural hosts of the virus and act as reservoirs and biological vectors of the infection.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, African swine fever (ASF) is defined as an infection of suids with ASFV.

The following defines infection with ASFV:

1) ASFV has been isolated from samples from a suid;

OR

2) viral antigen has been identified, or viral nucleic acid specific to ASFV has been demonstrated to be present in samples from a suid epidemiologically linked to a suspected or confirmed outbreak of ASF, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with ASFV, whether or not clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with ASF are present;

OR

3) antibodies specific to ASFV have been identified in samples from a suid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with ASF, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected outbreak of ASF, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with ASFV.

A Member Country should not impose bans on the trade in commodities of domestic and captive wild pigs in response to a notification of infection with ASFV in wild and feral pigs or African wild suids provided that Article 15.1.2. is implemented.

For the purpose of the *Terrestrial Code*, the incubation period in *Sus scrofa* ~~is~~ shall be 15 days.

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

## Article 15.1.2.

**General criteria for the determination of the ASF status of a country, zone or**

**compartment**

The African swine fever (ASF) status of a country, ~~zone or compartment~~ can only be determined after considering the following criteria in domestic and wild pigs, as applicable:

- 1) ASF ~~should be~~ is notifiable in the whole country, and all suids showing clinical signs suggestive of ASF are subjected to appropriate field and *laboratory* investigations;
- 2) an ongoing awareness programme is in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of ASF;
- 3) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic and captive wild pig herds in the country, ~~zone or compartment~~;
- 4) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge about the species, population and habitat of wild suids pigs in the country or ~~zone~~;
- 5) for domestic and captive wild pigs, an appropriate surveillance programme in accordance with Articles 15.1.22. to 15.1.27. is in place;
- 6) for wild and feral pigs, and for African wild suids, if present in the country or zone, a surveillance programme is in place according to Article 15.1.26., taking into account the presence of natural and artificial boundaries, the ecology of the wild and feral pig and African wild suid populations and an assessment of the risks of disease spread including the presence of *Ornithodoros* ticks;
- 7) based on the assessed risk of spread within the wild and feral pig and African wild suid populations, and according to Article 15.1.26., the domestic and captive wild pig population should be separated from the wild and feral pig and African wild suid populations by appropriate measures.

## Article 15.1.3.

**Country or zone free from ASF ~~free country, zone or compartment~~**1. Historically free status

A country or *zone* may be considered historically free from ASF without formally applying a specific *surveillance* programme if the provisions of point 1 of Article 1.4.6. are complied with.

2. Free status as a result of an eradication programme

A country or *zone* which does not meet the conditions of point 1 above ~~or a compartment~~ may be considered free from ASF when:

- a) there has been no *outbreak* of ASF in domestic and captive wild pigs during the past 12 months ~~three years~~; this period can be reduced to 12 months when there is no evidence of tick involvement in the epidemiology of the *infection*;
- b) ~~no evidence of ASFV infection with ASFV in domestic and captive wild pigs has been found during the past 12 months;~~
- be) surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.1.22. to 15.1.27. has been in place in domestic and captive wild pigs for the past 12 months;
- cd) imported domestic and captive wild pigs and pig commodities comply with the requirements ~~of~~ Articles 15.1.5. or to Article 15.1.617.

## AND

~~Based on surveillance, ASF infection has been demonstrated not to be present in any wild pig population in the country or zone, and:~~

- e) ~~there has been no clinical evidence, nor virological evidence of ASF in wild pigs during the past 12 months;~~
- f) ~~no seropositive wild pigs have been detected in the age class 6–12 months during the past 12 months;~~
- g) ~~imported wild pigs comply with the requirements in Article 15.1.7.~~

Article 15.1.3.bisCompartment free from ASF

The establishment of an ASF free *compartment* should follow the relevant requirements of this chapter and the principles in Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.

Article 15.1.3.terEstablishment of a containment zone within a country or zone free from ASF

In the event of limited *outbreaks* of ASF within a country or *zone* free from ASF, including within a *protection zone*, a *containment zone*, which includes all *outbreaks*, can be established for the purpose of minimising the impact on the entire country or *zone*.

In addition to the requirements for the establishment of a *containment zone* outlined in point 3 of Article 4.3.3., the *surveillance* programme should take into account the presence and potential role of *wild* and *feral* pigs and any measures in place to avoid their dispersion.

The free status of the areas outside the *containment zone* is suspended while the *containment zone* is being established. The free status of these areas may be reinstated irrespective of the provisions of Article 15.1.4., once the *containment zone* is clearly established. It should be demonstrated that *commodities* for *international trade* have originated outside the *containment zone* unless these *commodities* comply with the provisions in Articles 15.1.6., 15.1.9., 15.1.11. and Articles 15.1.13. to 15.1.17.

The recovery of the ASF free status of the *containment zone* should follow the provisions of Article 15.1.4.

## Article 15.1.4.

## Recovery of free status

Should an ASF *outbreak* occur in a free country, ~~or zone or compartment~~, the free status may be restored where *surveillance* has been carried out with negative results, either:

- 1) three months after the last case where a *stamping-out policy* is practised ~~and in the case where ticks are suspected to be involved in the epidemiology of the infection~~, followed by ~~acaricide treatment and the use of sentinel pigs~~; or

**EU comment**

**In point 1 above, the EU suggests adding the words "except in regions where the role of ticks in the epidemiology of the disease has been excluded" after the words "followed by the use of sentinel pigs". Indeed, the use of sentinel pigs would not seem necessary in areas where, due to geography and climate, it can be demonstrated that ticks do not play a role in the epidemiology of the disease.**

**Furthermore, the EU invites the OIE to provide guidance on how long sentinel pigs need to be present taking account of the full lifecycle of ticks in order for sentinels to provide the necessary level of assurance.**

- 2) where a *stamping-out policy* is not practised, the provisions of point 2 of Article 15.1.3. should be followed.

AND

~~Based on surveillance, ASF infection has been demonstrated not to be present in any wild pig population in the country or zone.~~

## Article 15.1.5.

**Recommendations for importation from ~~ASF-free~~ countries, zones or compartments free from ASF**

For domestic and captive wild pigs

*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment;
- 2) were kept in an ~~ASF-free~~ country, zone or compartment free from ASF since birth or for at least the past 40 days three months.

Article 15.1.6.

**Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with ASF**

For domestic and captive wild pigs

*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

- 1) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment;
- 2) and either:
  - a) were kept since birth or for the past 40 days three months in an ~~ASF-free~~ compartment free from ASF; or
  - b) were kept in a quarantine station, isolated for 30 days prior to shipment, and were subjected to a virological test and a serological test performed at least 21 days after entry into the quarantine station, with negative results.

**EU comment**

**The EU supports the above new point b), opening the possibility to import animals that have been kept in a quarantine station. The EU notes that such a provision is not included in the chapter on CSF, which could be considered adding when revising that chapter in the future.**

Article 15.1.7.

~~Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries or zones~~

For wild pigs

~~*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:~~

- 1) ~~showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment;~~
- 2) ~~have been captured in an ASF-free country or zone;~~  
and, if the zone where the animal has been captured is adjacent to a zone with infection in wild pigs:
- 3) ~~were kept in a quarantine station for 40 days prior to shipment, and were subjected to a virological test and a serological test performed at least 21 days after entry into the quarantine station, with negative results.~~

Article 15.1.8.

**Recommendations for importation from ~~ASF-free~~ countries, zones or compartments free from ASF**

For semen of domestic and captive wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor ~~animals~~ males:
  - a) were kept in an ~~ASF free~~ country, zone or *compartment* free from ASF since birth or for at least 40 ~~days~~ three months prior to collection;
  - b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the semen;
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in ~~conformity~~ accordance with the ~~provisions~~ of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 15.1.9.

**Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with ASF**

For semen of domestic and captive wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor ~~animals~~ males:
  - a) were kept in an ~~ASF free~~ establishment ~~compartment~~ free from ASF since birth or for at least 40 ~~days~~ three months prior to collection;
  - b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the semen and for the following 40 ~~30~~ days;
  - c) were subjected to a serological test performed at least 21 days after collection, with negative results;
- 2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in ~~conformity~~ accordance with the ~~provisions~~ of Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 15.1.10.

**Recommendations for importation from ~~ASF free~~ countries, zones or compartments free from ASF**

For *in vivo* derived embryos of domestic pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor females:
  - a) ~~were kept in an ASF free country, zone or compartment since birth or for at least 40 days prior to collection;~~
  - a) were kept in a country, zone or compartment free from ASF since birth or for at least three months prior to collection;
  - b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the embryos;
- 2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in ~~conformity~~ accordance with the ~~provisions~~ of Chapters 4.7. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 15.1.11.

**Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with ASF**

For *in vivo* derived embryos of domestic pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the donor females:



- a) were kept in an ~~ASF free compartment free from ASF~~ since birth or for at least ~~40 days~~ three months prior to collection;
  - b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the embryos and for the following ~~40~~ 30 days;
  - c) were subjected to a serological test performed at least 21 days after collection, with negative results;
- 2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity accordance with the provisions of Chapters 4.7. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 15.1.12.

**Recommendations for importation from ASF-free countries, zones or compartments free from ASF**

For fresh meat of domestic and captive wild pigs

*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the entire consignment of *fresh meat* comes from animals which:

- 1) have been kept in an ~~ASF-free country, zone or compartment free from ASF~~ since birth or for at least the ~~past 40 days~~, or which have been imported in accordance with Article 15.1.5. or Article 15.1.6.;

#### **EU comment**

**In point 1 above, the EU suggests deleting the words "since birth", for consistency with the corresponding provision of the CSF chapter (Article 15.2.14.). Alternatively, the words "or for at least the past 40 days" should be reinstated. A further alternative would be the wording from Art. 15.1.10. and 15.1.11. (i.e. "since birth or for at least three months").**

**Furthermore, the EU suggests inserting the words "or introduced" after the words "or which have been imported". Indeed, animals can also be introduced from zones within the same country, or in the case of the EU, from another Member State of the EU (EU single market), in which cases the word "imported" would not be correct.**

- 2) have been slaughtered in an approved slaughterhouse/abattoir, have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2., and have been found free of from any sign suggestive of ASF.

Article 15.1.12.bis

**Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with ASF**

For fresh meat of domestic and captive wild pigs

*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the entire consignment of fresh meat comes from animals which have been slaughtered in an approved slaughterhouse/abattoir, have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2., and have been found free from any sign suggestive of ASF;
- 2) appropriate samples have been collected from every animal killed and been subjected to a virological test and a serological test for ASF, with negative results.

#### **EU comment**

**The EU suggests amending point 2 above, as it seems overly prescriptive. Indeed, under certain circumstances it seems unnecessary to test samples from every single domestic or captive wild pig killed. For example, if a group or several groups of pigs from the same point of origin with the same health status are being slaughtered, it may be possible to design a statistically representative sampling regime that gives a high level of assurance that ASF would be detected if present, and thus it should be sufficient to test a representative number of animals only. The EU therefore suggests adding the following at the end of point 2 above:**

**"However, in appropriate circumstances statistically representative samples may be collected from pigs killed such that the sampling protocol provides a high level of assurance that the pigs killed are all free of ASFV."**

Article 15.1.13.

Recommendations for importation ~~from ASF free countries or zones~~ of fresh meat of wild and feral pigs

For fresh meat of wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

- 1) the entire consignment of *fresh meat* comes from *animals* which:
  - a) ~~have been killed in an ASF free country or zone;~~
  - b) have been subjected to a post-mortem inspection in accordance with Chapter 6.2. in an approved examination centre, and have been found free of any sign suggestive of ASF;

and,

- 2) if the country or the zone where the *animal* has been killed does not comply with the conditions of point 1 of Article 1.4.6. or is adjacent to a country or zone with *infection* in wild or feral pigs,
- 2) appropriate samples ~~has~~ have been collected from every animal killed and ~~has~~ been subjected to a virological test and a serological test for ASF, with negative results.

#### **EU comment**

The way the article above has been redrafted is confusing. Indeed, it is not entirely clear which countries are targeted by point 2, as reference is not made to countries free of ASF (in domestic pigs and / or wildlife), but to countries complying with point 1 of Article 1.4.6. That provision includes requirements regarding infection in wildlife, both in point 1 a. and 1 b. of Article 1.4.6. ("*infection is not known to be established in wildlife within the country or zone.*"). However, in reading point 1 b. of Article 1.4.6 it appears to only require freedom from ASF in wildlife (sub-point v) if there are no "pathogen-specific surveillance requirements". For ASF there are pathogen-specific surveillance requirements, yet these do not specifically require freedom from ASF in wildlife. Thus, point 2 above as currently drafted appears to allow for countries with ASF in wildlife who conduct a surveillance programme to take advantage of this measure and not test feral pigs intended for trade, which is probably not intended. To avoid any possible confusion, there should in general be clear references to country status, both as regards domestic pigs and wildlife, instead reference to point 1 of Article 1.4.6.

However, the EU is of the opinion that countries or zones with ASFV infection in wildlife should in general not export fresh meat of wild and feral pigs, and that Article 15.1.13. should be deleted. Indeed, there still seem to be uncertainties in relation to the reliability of testing of wild boar carcasses for ensuring no ASFV present in individual carcasses, considering that doubts remain on the reliability of both serological and virological testing, as well as nucleic acid detection (PCR) tests performed in the absence of any clinical observation of the wild pigs). In this context, it is also unclear what type of samples could be considered appropriate (from what organs, and how many).

Article 15.1.14.

Recommendations for the importation of meat products of pigs ~~(either domestic or wild), or for products of animal origin (from fresh meat of pigs) intended for use in animal feeding, for agricultural or industrial use, or for pharmaceutical or surgical use, or for trophies derived from wild pigs~~

*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the products:

- 1) have been prepared:
  - a) exclusively from *fresh meat* meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;
  - b) in a processing establishment:
    - i) approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes;
    - ii) processing only *meat* meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;

#### **EU comment**

**The EU suggests deleting the words ", as relevant" from both points 1 a) and 1 b) above, as they are not necessary and might give rise to confusion.**

OR

- 2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.

#### **EU comment**

**The EU suggests adding the words "in accordance with the relevant article" after the words "destruction of ASFV".**

Article 15.1.15.

~~Recommendations for the importation of pig products of animal origin (from pigs, but not derived from fresh meat) intended for use in animal feeding and for agricultural or industrial use~~

*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products:

- 1) ~~have been prepared:~~ originated from domestic and captive wild pigs in a country, zone or compartment free from ASF and have been prepared in a processing establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes;
  - a) ~~exclusively from fresh meat meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;~~
  - b) ~~in a processing establishment:~~
    - i) ~~approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes;~~
    - ii) ~~processing only meat meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;~~

OR

- 2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, for swill in accordance with Article 15.1.18., and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.

Article 15.1.16.

~~Recommendations for the importation of bristles, litter and manure (from pigs)~~

*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products:

- 1) originated from domestic and captive wild pigs in a country, zone or compartment free from ASF and have been processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority for export purposes; or
- 2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.

### **EU comment**

**The EU notes that there are no specific recommendations for the treatment of manure to ensure the destruction of ASFV, and suggests including guidance on procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in manure.**

~~Article 15.1.17.~~

#### ~~Recommendations for the importation of litter and manure (from pigs)~~

~~Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products:~~

- 1) ~~come from an ASF free country, zone or compartment; or~~
- 2) ~~have been processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.~~

Article 15.1.17.

#### Recommendations for the importation of skins and trophies

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the products:

- 1) originated from domestic and captive wild pigs in a country, zone or compartment free from ASF and have been processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority for export purposes; or
- 2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the Veterinary Authority for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of ASFV in accordance with one of the procedures referred to in Article 15.1.21., and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.

Article 15.1.18.

#### Procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in swill

For the inactivation of ASFV in swill, one of the following procedures should be used:

- 1) the swill should be maintained at a temperature of at least 90°C for at least 60 minutes, with continuous stirring; or
- 2) the swill should be maintained at a temperature of at least 121°C for at least 10 minutes at an absolute pressure of 3 bar.

Article 15.1.19.

#### Procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in meat

For the inactivation of ASFV in meat, one of the following procedures should be used:

##### 1. Heat treatment

Meat should be subjected to one of the following treatments:

- a) heat treatment in a hermetically sealed container with a Fo value of 3.00 or more; or

- b) heat treatment for at least 30 minutes at a minimum temperature of 70°C, which should be reached throughout the *meat*.

## 2. Dry cured pig meat

- a) if salted, *meat* should be cured and dried for a minimum of six months; or
- b) if not salted, *meat* should be cured and dried for a minimum of 12 months.

### Article 15.1.20.

#### Procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in casings of pigs

For the inactivation of ASFV present in casings of pigs, the following procedures should be used: treating for at least 30 days either with dry salt (NaCl) or with saturated brine ( $A_w < 0.80$ ), or with phosphate supplemented dry salt containing 86.5 percent NaCl, 10.7 percent  $Na_2HPO_4$  and 2.8 percent  $Na_3PO_4$  (weight/weight/weight), and kept at a temperature of greater than 12°C during this entire period.

### Article 15.1.21.

#### Procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in skins and trophies

For the inactivation of ASFV in skins and trophies, one of the following procedures should be used:

- 1) boiling in water for an appropriate time so as to ensure that any matter other than bone, tusks or teeth is removed; or
- 2) soaking, with agitation, in a 4 percent (w/v) solution of washing soda (sodium carbonate –  $Na_2CO_3$ ) maintained at pH 11.5 or above for at least 48 hours; or
- 3) soaking, with agitation, in a formic acid solution (100 kg salt [NaCl] and 12 kg formic acid per 1,000 litres water) maintained at below pH 3.0 for at least 48 hours; wetting and dressing agents may be added; or
- 4) in the case of raw hides, treating for at least 28 days with salt (NaCl) containing 2 percent washing soda (sodium carbonate –  $Na_2CO_3$ ); or
- 5) treatment with 1 percent formalin for a minimum of six days.

### Article 15.1.22.

#### Introduction to surveillance

Articles 15.1.22. to 15.1.27. define the principles and provide a guide on the *surveillance* for ASF, complementary to Chapter 1.4. and Chapter 1.5., applicable to Member Countries seeking to determine their ASF status. This may be for the entire country or a *zone*. Guidance is also provided for Member Countries seeking recovery of ASF free status for the entire country or for a *zone* following an *outbreak* and for the maintenance of ASF free status.

The impact and epidemiology of ASF may vary in different regions of the world. The *surveillance* strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from ASF should be adapted to the regional or sub-regional situation. For example, the approach should be tailored in order to demonstrate freedom from ASF for a country or *zone* where *wild* and *feral* pigs or African *wild* suids provide a potential reservoir of *infection*, or where ASF is present in adjacent countries. The method should examine the epidemiology of ASF in the region concerned and adapt to the specific risk factors encountered. This should include provision of scientifically based supporting data. There is, therefore, latitude available to Member Countries to provide a well-reasoned argument to demonstrate that absence of *infection* with ASFV is assured at an acceptable level of confidence.

#### **EU comment**

**As transmission of ASF between herds of domestic pigs is highly dependent on routine biosecurity measures at the farm level, the EU suggests adding this aspect to the above paragraph as follows:**

**"The impact and epidemiology of ASF may vary in different regions of the world, as does the routine biosecurity measures in different production systems."**

Furthermore, the epidemiology also depends on whether competent ticks are present or not in the country or region. The EU therefore suggests adding this to the paragraph above, as follows:

**"[...] For example, the approach should be tailored in order to demonstrate freedom from ASF for a country or zone where wild and feral pigs or African wild suids provide a potential reservoir of infection, or a country where a suitable tick host is present, or where ASF is present in adjacent countries. [...]"**

Surveillance for ASF should be in the form of an ongoing programme designed to establish that susceptible populations in a country, zone or compartment are free from infection with ASFV or to detect the introduction of ASFV into a free population. Consideration should be given to the specific characteristics of ASF epidemiology which include:

- = the role of swill feeding;
- = the impact of different production systems;
- = the role of wild and feral pigs and African wild suids on the maintenance and spread of the disease;
- = whether Ornithodoros ticks are present and the role they may play in the maintenance and spread of the disease;
- = the role of semen in transmission of the ASFV;
- = the lack of pathognomonic gross lesions and clinical signs;
- = the occurrence of apparently healthy carriers;
- = the genotypic variability of ASFV.

#### Article 15.1.23.

#### General conditions and methods for surveillance

- 1) A surveillance system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and under the responsibility of the Veterinary Authority should address the following:
  - a) a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating outbreaks of ASF;
  - b) a procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspected cases to a laboratory for ASF diagnosis;
  - c) a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic and surveillance data.
- 2) The ASF surveillance programme should:
  - a) include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspected cases. Diagnosticians and those with regular contact with pigs should report promptly any suspicion of ASF to the Veterinary Authority. The notification system under the Veterinary Authority should be supported directly or indirectly (e.g. through private veterinarians or veterinary para-professionals) by government information programmes targeted to all relevant stakeholders. Personnel responsible for surveillance should be able to seek expertise in ASF diagnosis, epidemiological evaluation and control;

#### **EU comment**

**As information programmes run by the pig industry may also be present in some countries, the EU suggests inserting the words "or private" after the word "government" in point 2 a) above.**

- b) conduct, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspections and laboratory testing of high-risk groups (for example, where swill feeding is practised), or those adjacent to an ASF infected country or zone (for example, bordering areas where infected wild and feral pigs or African wild suids are present).

Article 15.1.24.

### Surveillance strategies

#### 1. Introduction

The population covered by surveillance aimed at detecting disease and infection should include domestic and wild pig populations within the country or zone. Surveillance should be composed of random and non-random approaches using clinical, virological and serological methods appropriate for the infection status of the country or zone.

The practicality of surveillance in African wild suids should be considered following the guidelines in Chapter 1.4.

### **EU comment**

**The sentence above is very general and could be further detailed. It is known that ASFV is present in wild African suids and that these pigs might be subclinically infected. However, they have different roles in ASF epidemiology and should therefore not be discussed in general terms.**

**This comment is also relevant for point 1 of Article 15.1.26.**

The strategy employed to establish the prevalence or absence of infection with ASFV may be based on randomised or non-randomised clinical investigation or sampling at an acceptable level of statistical confidence. If an increased likelihood of infection in particular localities or sub-populations can be identified, targeted sampling may be an appropriate strategy. This may include:

- a) specific high-risk wild and feral pig populations and their proximity;
- b) farms which feed swill;
- c) pigs reared outdoors.

Risk factors may include, for example, temporal and spatial distribution of past outbreaks, and pig movements and demographics.

Member Countries should review their surveillance strategies whenever an increase in the risk of incursion of ASFV is perceived. Such changes include but are not limited to:

- = an emergence or an increase in the prevalence of ASF in countries or zones from which live pigs or products are imported;
- = an increase in the prevalence of ASF in wild or feral pigs in the country or zone;
- = an increase in the prevalence of ASF in adjacent countries or zones;
- = an increased entry of, or exposure to, infected wild or feral pig populations of adjacent countries or zones;
- = evidence of involvement of ticks in the epidemiology of ASF as demonstrated by surveillance implemented in accordance with Chapter 1.5.

#### 2. Clinical surveillance

Clinical surveillance is the most effective tool for detecting ASF due to severe clinical signs and pathology associated with infection with ASFV. However, due to the clinical similarity with other diseases such as classical swine fever, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome and erysipelas, and those associated with porcine circovirus 2 infection, clinical surveillance should be supplemented, as appropriate, by serological and virological surveillance.

Clinical signs and pathological findings are useful for early detection; in particular, any cases where clinical signs or lesions suggestive of ASF are accompanied by high mortality should be investigated without delay.

Wild and feral pigs rarely present the opportunity for clinical observation, but should form part of any surveillance scheme and should, ideally, be monitored for virus as well as antibodies.

### 3. Virological surveillance

Virological surveillance is important for early detection, differential diagnosis and for systematic sampling of target populations. It should be conducted:

- a) to investigate clinically suspected cases;
- b) to monitor at risk populations;
- c) to follow up positive serological results;
- d) to investigate increased mortality.

#### **EU comment**

**A blanket requirement to investigate increased mortality is onerous and expensive. The EU believes this requirement should apply only in circumstances which are suggestive of ASF.**

**The EU therefore suggests amending point 3 d) above as follows:**

**"d) to investigate increased mortality where clinical signs are suggestive of ASF or where there are epidemiological links to confirmed or suspect outbreaks of ASF or to regions affected by ASF."**

Molecular detection methods can be applied to large-scale screening for the presence of virus. If targeted at high-risk groups, they provide an opportunity for early detection that can considerably reduce the subsequent spread of ASF. Epidemiological understanding of the pathways of spread of ASFV can be greatly enhanced by molecular analyses of viruses in endemic areas and those involved in outbreaks in ASF-free areas. Therefore, ASFV isolates should be sent to an OIE Reference Laboratory for further characterisation.

### 4. Serological surveillance

Serology is an effective and efficient surveillance tool. Serological surveillance aims at detecting antibodies against ASFV. Positive ASFV antibody test results can indicate an ongoing or past outbreak, since some animals may recover and remain seropositive for a significant period, possibly life. This may include carrier animals.

#### **EU comment**

**As the usefulness of serology as a surveillance tool depends on the situation, the EU suggests rewording the above paragraph as follows:**

**"Serology could be is an effective and efficient surveillance tool, mainly in endemic situations where control measures are taken late in an outbreak or as a way to find the last remaining cases in an eradication situation. Serological surveillance aims at detecting antibodies against ASFV. Positive ASFV antibody test results can indicate an ongoing or past outbreak, since some animals may recover and remain seropositive for a**



**significant period, possibly life. This may include carrier animals. However, ASF serology is not a suitable surveillance tool for early detection.**"

It may be possible to use sera collected for other survey purposes for ASF surveillance. However, the principles of survey design and the requirement for statistical validity should not be compromised.

Article 15.1.25.

**Surveillance procedures for recovery of free status**

In addition to the general conditions described in Articles 15.1.3. and 15.1.4., a Member Country seeking recovery of country or zone ASF-free status, including a *containment zone*, should show evidence of an active *surveillance* programme to demonstrate no evidence of *infection* with ASFV.

The domestic and *captive wild* pig populations should undergo regular clinical and pathological examinations and virological and serological testing, planned and implemented according to the general conditions and methods described in this chapter.

This *surveillance* programme should include:

- 1) *establishments* in the proximity of the *outbreaks*;
- 2) *establishments* epidemiologically linked to the *outbreaks*;
- 3) animals moved from or used to repopulate affected *establishments*;

**EU comment**

**The EU suggests adding the words "including sentinel pigs" at the end of point 3) above, to specify that these are also to be included in the surveillance programme. Indeed, sentinel pigs are necessary in regions where ticks play a role in the epidemiology of the disease.**

- 4) all *establishments* where contiguous culling has been carried out;
- 5) *wild* and *feral* pig populations in the area of the *outbreaks*.

Article 15.1.26.

**Surveillance for ASFV in wild and feral pigs**

1) The objective of a *surveillance* programme is either to demonstrate that *infection* with ASFV is not present in *wild* and *feral* pigs or, if known to be present, to estimate the geographical distribution of the *infection*. A similar approach should be taken with respect to African *wild* suids where appropriate. While the same principles apply, *surveillance* in *wild* and *feral* pigs presents additional challenges including:

- a) determination of the distribution, size and movement patterns associated with the *wild* and *feral* pig population;
- b) relevance and practicality of assessing the possible presence of *infection* with ASFV within the population;
- c) determination of the practicability of establishing a *zone* taking into account the degree of interaction with domestic and *captive wild* pigs within the proposed *zone*.

The geographic distribution and estimated size of *wild* and *feral* pig populations should be assessed as a prerequisite for designing a population monitoring system following Chapter 1.4.

- 2) For implementation of the *surveillance* programme, the limits of the area over which *wild* and *feral* pigs range should be defined. Subpopulations of *wild* and *feral* pig may be separated from each other by natural or artificial barriers.
- 3) The *surveillance* programme should include animals found dead, road kills, animals showing abnormal behaviour or hunted animals.

**EU comment**

**It is important that the surveillance programme is appropriate to the risk and therefore the relevance of point 3) above will depend on the structure of the feral population, the**

**history of disease in the country and the most likely routes of incursion. The EU therefore suggests replacing the word "should" by the word "could".**

- 4) There may be situations where a more targeted *surveillance* programme can provide additional assurance. The criteria to define high risk areas for targeted *surveillance* include:
- a) areas with past history of ASF;
  - b) sub-regions with large populations of *wild* and *feral* pigs or African *wild* suids;
  - c) border regions with ASF affected countries or zones;
  - d) interface between *wild* and *feral* pig populations, and domestic and *captive wild* pig populations;
  - e) areas with farms with free-ranging and outdoor pigs;
  - f) areas with a high level of hunting activity, where animal dispersion and feeding as well as inappropriate disposal of waste can occur;
  - g) other risk areas determined by the *Veterinary Authority* such as ports, airports, garbage dumps and picnic and camping areas.

Article 15.1.27.

#### Surveillance for arthropod vectors

Vector surveillance aims at defining the type and distribution of ticks of the genus *Ornithodoros*, the only known arthropod vectors of ASFV. Any species of *Ornithodoros* ticks should be considered as potential vector or reservoir of ASFV. The virus is generally transmitted transstadially but transovarial transmission has only been observed in ticks of the *Ornithodoros moubata* complex.

The *Competent Authority* should have knowledge of the presence, distribution and identity of *Ornithodoros* ticks, also taking into account climatic or habitat changes which may affect distribution.

A sampling plan in accordance with Chapter 1.5. should take into account the biology and ecology of species present and, in particular, the favoured habitat of these species in burrows and structures associated with pig production. The plan should also take into account the distribution and density of pigs in the country or zone.

Sampling methods include CO<sub>2</sub> trapping and vacuuming of burrows or structures.

#### **EU comment**

**The article above should be supplemented with an indication of when vector surveillance is needed. Except for situations where ASF is becoming endemic in areas where outdoor rearing of pigs is a prominent feature and the goal is eradication of the disease, there is limited need for extensive vector surveillance.**

**Furthermore, depending on the geography and climate, there are regions of the world where competent vectors are not present and therefore do not play a role in the epidemiology of the disease. This should be mentioned in the article above.**

**FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME FOR THE  
TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION**

**EU comment**

The EU thanks the OIE for having taken most of its previous comments on the work programme into consideration and supports the future work programme as proposed.

As a matter of high priority, and as indicated in the EU comments in Annex XXI, the EU urges the OIE Code Commission to continue revising the BSE chapter in line with the recommendations of the OIE BSE ad hoc group at its September 2015 meeting, including on the feed ban and on a restricted list for SRM for atypical BSE, with a view to proposing a revised chapter for adoption at the May 2016 OIE General Session.

Furthermore, the EU supports and encourages the OIE Code Commission to embark on work on new horizontal chapters on vaccination strategies, on contingency planning, outbreak management and stamping-out policy, and on safe commodities to be included in Section 4 of the Terrestrial Code.

As mentioned in the EU comment on the Bluetongue chapter, the EU would ask the OIE Code Commission to work further on the harmonisation of the vector-borne disease chapters of the OIE Code (i.e., BT, EHD, AHS, RVF). Indeed, whereas a lot of work has already been done to harmonise these chapters, there are still certain differences across these chapters, mainly linked to the vocabulary used. Therefore, additional work seems necessary to further harmonise these chapters. Furthermore, certain key concepts of these chapters should be thoroughly reviewed in light of experience in international trade and latest scientific knowledge. Data to this effect will be provided by the EU in due course. Finally, Europe suggests excluding infections with non-pathogenic serotypes from the case definition of Bluetongue. Indeed, recent scientific knowledge seems to indicate that certain serotypes do not cause clinical signs in any of the susceptible species, and therefore do not meet the listing criteria. They should thus not be subject to notification obligations nor affect the Bluetongue status of the country concerned.

Furthermore, with reference to the EU comments in Annex XXV and on point 4 of the introduction of the report regarding Annex XXXIV, the EU encourages the OIE Code Commission to review Chapter 1.1. on notification of diseases and the WAHIS / WAHID systems for coherence. The guiding principle for that review should be that WAHIS / WAHID follow the standards specified in the OIE Code.

Moreover, concerning the previous EU comments regarding the mentioning of Veterinary Public Health in the definition of "Veterinary Authority", made both for the Terrestrial and Aquatic Codes, the EU notes with appreciation the comment of the Aquatic Animals Commission in its March 2015 meeting report, stating that this definition should be reviewed jointly with the Code Commission. The EU would encourage both OIE Specialist Commissions to jointly review that definition at their next meeting in September 2015.

Finally, with reference to the discussions during the OIE General Session in May 2015 on further harmonisation where possible of horizontal chapters of the Aquatic and the Terrestrial Code, and in particular the adoption by the World Assembly of a new Aquatic Code Chapter 6.5. "*Risk analysis for antimicrobial resistance arising from the use of antimicrobial agents in aquatic animals*" which diverges significantly from

**Chapter 6.10. "Risk analysis for antimicrobial resistance arising from the use of antimicrobial agents in animals" of the Terrestrial Code, the EU reiterates its request to both the OIE Terrestrial and the Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commissions to pursue these important harmonisation efforts and to cooperate ever more closely in order to improve the relevant working procedures in order to overcome these challenges in the future.**

Topic		
Action	How to be managed	Status (Feb. 2015)
<b>Restructuring of the <i>Terrestrial Code</i>, including Harmonisation of the <i>Terrestrial</i> and <i>Aquatic Codes</i></b>		
1) Work with AAHSC towards harmonisation, as appropriate, of the <i>Codes</i>	1) TAHSC & ITD	1) Ongoing
2) CH rename by disease agents	2) TAHSC & ITD	2) Ongoing
3) Revision and formatting of Section 7	3) TAHSC & AWWG	3) Ongoing
4) Revision of the Users' guide	4) TAHSC & SCAD	4) Revised User's guide for adoption
5) OIE policy on wildlife	5) TAHSC with WG on Wildlife & SCAD	5) Ongoing
<b>Glossary</b>		
1) Definition of OIE 'standards'	1) TAHSC & AAHSC & BSC & SCAD	1) Ongoing
2) Definition of 'Veterinary Authority' and 'Veterinary Services'	2) TAHSC	2) Ongoing
3) Definition of 'Safe commodities'	3) TAHSC	3) For adoption & ongoing
4) Definition of 'Stamping-out policy'	4) TAHSC	4) For adoption & ongoing
<b>Horizontal issue</b>		
Vaccination strategies	TAHSC & BSC & SCAD	Ongoing
<b>Listed diseases</b>		
Criteria for listing	TAHSC & SCAD & SIS	For comment
<b>Evaluation of VS and OIE PVS pathway</b>		
Veterinary education aspect	TAHSC & AHG & ITD	On hold
<b>Veterinary products (AMR)</b>		
1) Updating CH 6.9.	TAHSC & SCAD & AHG	1) Adopted
2) Updating CH 6.10.		2) For adoption
3) Updating CH 6.7.		3) For adoption
<b>FMD</b>		
Revise chapter	SCAD & TAHSC	For adoption
<b>Horse diseases</b>		
1) International movement of competition horses	1) AHG/SCAD & TAHSC	1) Revised CH for adoption and draft certificate for MC
2) Update Dourine CH	2) SCAD/TAHSC	2) Pending expert advice
3) Update Glanders CH	3) AHG/SCAD/TAHSC	3) Pending expert advice
<b>CWD</b>		
Decision on listing (new CH)	TAHSC & SCAD & AHG	Pending AHG
<b>PRRS</b>		

New CH	TAHSC/SCAD/AHG	Draft CH and MC pending expert advice
--------	----------------	---------------------------------------

<b>Other Terrestrial Code texts on diseases in need of revision</b>		
<b>Action</b>	<b>How to be managed</b>	<b>Status (Feb. 2015)</b>
Review CH on BSE	SCAD/TAHSC	For adoption & ongoing
Update BT and EHD in line with AHS	TAHSC	For adoption
Update CH on brucellosis	TAHSC	For adoption
Update CH on tuberculosis	AHG/SCAD & TAHSC	Ongoing
Update CH on avian mycoplasmosis	SCAD and TAHSC	Seek expert opinion
Update CH on ASF	TAHSC	For comment
Pet food certificate CH	TAHSC	On hold
Update CH on scrapie	TAHSC	Ongoing
Update CH on theileriosis	TAHSC	Seek expert opinion
Update CH on lumpy skin disease	TAHSC	Seek expert opinion
<b>Animal production food safety</b>		
1) Collaboration with Codex	1) TAHSC and ITD	1) Ongoing
2) <i>Taenia solium</i> (Porcine cysticercosis)	2) TAHSC	2) For adoption
3) Salmonellosis in pig herds	3) AHG & TAHSC	3) Draft CH & MC for AHG
4) Salmonellosis in cattle	4) AHG & TAHSC	4) Draft CH for MC for AHG
<b>Animal welfare</b>		
1) Broiler production systems	AWWG & AHGs &TAHSC	1) Revised CH 7.10. for adoption
2) Dairy cattle production systems		2) Draft new CH for adoption
3) CH 7.5. and 7.6.		3) Ongoing
4) Disaster management		4) Ongoing
5) Working equids		5) Draft CH & MC for AHG

Note: MC: Member comments; CH: chapter; Q: questionnaire; SURV: surveillance; ITD: International Trade Department; S&T Dept: Scientific and Technical Department; SIS: World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department.

## ITEM, ANNEX, CHAPTER NUMBERS AND CURRENT STATUS

Item	Annex	Chapter	Title	Provided for comments	GS83
1			General comments		
2	IV		User's guide	Sep 14	A
3	V		Glossary	Sep.14	A
4	XXV	1.1	Notification of diseases, infections and infestations, and provision of epidemiological information		C
	XXVI	1.2	Criteria for inclusion of disease, infections and infestations in the OIE list		C
5	VI	3.2.	Evaluation of Veterinary Services	Sep 14	A
6		4.6.	Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen	Sep 14	D
	VII	4.7.	Collection and processing of <i>in vivo</i> derived embryos from livestock and equids	Sep 14	A
7	VIII	5.1. & 5.2.	General obligations related to certification & certification procedures	Sep 14	A
8	IX	6.5.	Prevention, detection and control of <i>Salmonella</i> in poultry	Sep 14	A
9		6.X.	Prevention, detection and control of <i>Salmonella</i> in pigs		E
10	XXVII	6.X.	Prevention, detection and control of <i>Salmonella</i> in cattle		C
11	X	7.X.	Animal welfare and dairy cattle production systems	Feb. 13	A
	XI	7.10.	Animal welfare and broiler chicken production systems	Sep. 14	A
	XII	7.5.	Slaughter of animals		A
	XXVIII	New	Guidelines for disaster risk reduction and management in relation to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health		I
		New	Animal welfare of working equids	Sep 14	D
12	XIII	8.X	Infection with epizootic haemorrhagic disease virus	Feb 13	A
	XIV	8.3.	Infection with bluetongue virus	Feb 13	A
13	XV	15.X.	Infection with <i>Taenia solium</i>	Feb 14	A
14	XVI	8.7.	Foot and mouth disease	Feb. 13	A
		1.6.	Procedure for self declaration and for official recognition by the OIE		
15	XVII	8.13.	Infection with Rift Valley fever virus	Sep. 14	A
16	XVIII	8.4.	Infection with <i>Brucella abortus</i> , <i>B. melitensis</i> and <i>B. suis</i>	Sep. 14	A
17	XIX	10.4.	Infection with avian influenza viruses	Sep. 14	A
18	XX	4.16.	High health status horse subpopulation	Sep. 14	A
	XXIX		Model veterinary certificate for HHP		C
19	XXX	15.1.	Infection with African swine fever virus		C
20	XXI	11.4	Bovine spongiform encephalopathy		A
21	XXXI		Report of the Animal Production Food Safety Working Group		I

## Annex XXXII (contd)

Item	Annex	Chapter	Title	Provided for comments	GS83
22	XXII	6.7.	Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes		A
	XXIII	6.10.	Risk assessment for antimicrobial resistance arising from the use of antimicrobials in animals		A
23	XXXII		Work programme		C

A: proposed for adoption at 83rd General Session; C: For Member comments; E: under expert consultation (*ad hoc* groups, Specialist Commissions, etc.), D: deferred to Sep 2015 meeting; I: For Member Country information.

List of abbreviations	
AAHSC	Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission
AHS	African horse sickness
APFSWG	Animal Production Food Safety Working Group
AWWG	Animal Welfare Working Group
EHD	Epizootic haemorrhagic disease
FMD	Foot and mouth disease
PPR	Peste des petits ruminants
PRRS	Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
SCAD	Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases
TAHSC	Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission