



# Mission of the Community Veterinary Emergency Team (CVET) to Latvia

(1-3 February 2017)

# Objective

**Reason:** ASF in a large commercial pig breeding farm (~5.000 pigs)  
ASF notified on 13. January 2017

*So far all outbreaks in domestic pigs in the Baltic States and Poland occurred during the summer and autumn months.*

**ToR: Provide assistance** to the scientific, technical, managerial and practical on-the-spot assistance on the refinement of the most suitable control and eradication measures for African Swine Fever (ASF) under local conditions, **especially as regards epidemiological investigations.**



## Background

- A large pig breeding farm with **apparently good biosecurity**
- Farm located in the restriction zone due to ASF in wild boar
- 5.000 animals (sows, piglets and boars) kept in 6 different stables
- After weaning piglets were delivered to a fattening farm belonging to the same company; last delivery of piglets was on 12th January  
*(on 7 Feb. 2017 ASF has been confirmed on fattening farm)*
- An increased morbidity and mortality of sows let to the suspicion of ASF during the second week of January 2017
- The competent authority started the epidemiological investigations on the farm immediately after ASF has been suspected
- It was noticed that during the last two months several employees of the farm lost their job being replaced by new staff

# Findings and Conclusions

## ***Farm biosecurity***

- The overall farm biosecurity can be regarded as **insufficient** to prevent the introduction of ASF virus.
- The weakest points were the sanitary filters (locker rooms) for the staff. People could bring and consume own food inside the farm.
- Farm vehicles could leave and enter the farm without proper disinfection.
- The farm is surrounded by a newly build fence.

# Findings and Conclusions







## ***Possible time period of virus introduction***







Based on the farm records (morbidity and mortality), the clinical and laboratory findings as well as the data provided by the rendering company **two possible time periods** of virus introductions can be seen:







**Hypothesis A:** Beginning of **December 2016** (*supported by the farm records on morbidity and mortality data*)

**Hypothesis B:** Introduction already in **September 2016** (supported by the mortality rate from September onwards reflected in the amount of dead animals (tons of carcasses) collected by the rendering plant)







- *Before Sep.: < 1000 kg/month*
- *Sep.: >4000 kg*
- *Oct., Nov., Dec.: >3000 kg/month*
- *Jan.: >5000 kg*



















**1st outbreak**  
breeding farm  
5000 pigs



**2nd outbreak**  
contact farm  
9000 pigs



7 Feb.



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## Findings and Conclusions

### ***Hypothesis of virus introduction routes***

Based on the findings related to the biosecurity of the farm, the most probable way of introduction is **linked to human activities**. In this regard two main aspects have to be mentioned:

- (i) no strict internal rules for the staff regarding the food for own consumption (no proper sanitary filter)*
- (ii) the huge turnover of employees during last months.*

# Recommendations and lessons to be learned

- There is a need of for clear biosecurity guideline for different pig production types (large commercial farms, back yards, etc.).  
**What does “good biosecurity” means?**
- Passive surveillance on domestic pig farms has to be increased and improved, particularly in ASF restricted areas. All dead pigs in commercial farms have to be (compulsory) checked for ASF even if mortality is below the normal threshold.
- Rendering plants should inform the competent authority when an increased amount of carcasses is collected from a farm.
- Training courses for veterinarians from the competent authorities to perform epidemiological investigations and risk assessments are recommended.

# Biosecurity


## Hardware



European  
Commission

## Software

*(Mind-set/Philosophy)*



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Increased Mortality



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**Thank you for your attention!**