



SPGP Expert Mission to Spain EU VET Initiative

24 - 26 May 2023


Background



- Between September and November 2022, Spain experienced 23 outbreaks of SPGP:
 - 13 in Andalucía - last outbreak on Nov 8th
 - 10 in Castilla – la Mancha – last outbreak on Nov 29th
- After two months without new outbreaks 7 SPGP outbreaks were detected in 2023 in Cuenca (3) and in Ciudad Real provinces (4)

Locations of the SPGP outbreaks (ADIS 2022/1-23 & 2023/1-7) in Spain till 17/05/2023

Background



Locations of the SPGP outbreaks ADIS 2023/1-7 with the merged **protection**, **surveillance**, and **further restricted** zones around the outbreaks ADIS 2023/3-6 in Ciudad Real.

- Between September and November 2022, Spain experienced 23 outbreaks of SPGP:
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Terms of reference:

Providing on-the-spot assistance

- most suitable SPGP eradication measures
- scientific, technical, managerial aspects

Experts: Tsviatko Alexandrov (BG), Kris De Clercq (BE), Nick De Regge (BE)
European Commission Representative: Dimitrios Dilaveris

Concrete questions

- Where and how was the disease maintained between the last outbreak, in November 2022 and the new outbreaks in January 2023
- How did it circulate between outbreaks ADIS 2023/1-6 and outbreak ADIS 2023/7 in Casas de Fernando Alonso, San Clemente, Cuenca?
- What are the main constraints in the control of the disease and routes of virus transmission between small ruminant establishments?
- What are the most immediate and urgent measures which need to be implemented to control the SPGP epidemic in Spain?

Places visited during the mission

Day 1. Alcazar de San Juan:


- Meeting with MAPA and OVS central regional Castilla-la Mancha.
- Field visit to SGP free establishment within the restriction zone
- Field visit to outbreak 2023/4

Day 2. Tomelloso:

- Meeting with official vets of the Local Veterinary Unit responsible for outbreaks of Belmonte, Alcázar de San Juan, and Casas de Fernando Alonso
- Visit to slaughterhouse
- Visit to outbreak 2023/7

Day 3. Madrid

- Final meeting with MAPA and OVS of Castilla – la Mancha



Most probable ways of virus introduction

Outbreak ID	Province	Municipality	Production type	Census	Suspicion date	N° clinically affected animals on the official visit	Samples taken and results	Confirmation date	Hypothesis for SPPV introduction
2023/1	Cuenca	La Alberca de Záncara	Milk farm	1359 sheep 311 goats	17.01.2023	50 sheep	9 saliva swabs / 8 POS	23.01.2023	<p>1. Contaminated truck, it was checked that this same truck was involved in outbreak 2023/23 in Tébar</p> <p>2. Biosecurity gaps</p>
2022/2	Cuenca	Tébar	Milk farm	3544 sheep	18.01.2023	0	35 saliva / 20 POS	23.01.2023	<p>1. Farm had good biosecurity measures and the farmer was aware of the disease</p> <p>2. In opinion of OVS: workers from other farms may met in pub or common places in the village, therefore with risk of spread</p> <p>3. Other hypothesis: this outbreak linked to 2022/23 also in Tébar → common road, so if the truck wasn't in good C&D conditions, it could have spread the virus).</p>
2023/3	Ciudad Real	Alcázar de San Juan	Fattening farm	8100 sheep	03.02.2022	480 sheep 5 dead	147 saliva swabs / 147 POS	07.02.2023	<p>1. Illegal animal movements</p> <p>2. Contaminated trucks</p> <p>3. Gaps in biosecurity</p> <p>4. Many links with assembly centers, slaughterhouses, other</p>
2023/4	Ciudad Real	Alcázar de San Juan	Milk farm	1216 sheep	17.03.2023	4 sheep	60 saliva swabs / 9 POS + 3 NC	21.03.2023	<p>1. Close proximity with outbreak 2023/3 and indirect introduction of the SPPV. In opinion of OVS, probably, through the wind from the other affected fattening farm (2023/3).</p>
2023/5	Ciudad Real	Alcázar de San Juan	Milk production farm	1410 sheep	25.03.2023	5 sheep	60 saliva swabs / 6 POS + 2 NC	29.03.2023	<p>1. One hypothesis is through the same milk truck as in outbreak 2023/4 and 6</p> <p>2. Also maybe through personnel that selected lambs, who may had been also involved in outbreak 2023/3</p>
2023/6	Ciudad Real	Alcázar de San Juan	Milk production farm	3142 sheep 260 goats	04.04.2023	0	145 saliva swabs / 2 POS	05.04.2023	<p>1. He is the same owner as for outbreak 2023/3 (who also owns the slaughterhouse). Probably by non-properly C&D truck.</p>
2023/7	Cuenca	Casas de Fernando Alonso	Milk production farm	334 sheep 27 goats	15.05.2023	21 sheep 2 dead	21 saliva / 21 POS	16.05.2023	<p>1. Illegal animal movements</p> <p>2. Contaminated trucks</p> <p>3. Gaps in biosecurity</p>

Most probable ways of virus introduction

Outbreak 2023/3



Outbreak 2023/4

contaminated
trucks

non-authorized
animal
movements

proximity to
highly infected
farms (e.g.
outbreaks ADIS
2023/3 and
ADIS 2023/4)

Epidemiologically
linked farms (of
the same owner,
etc.)

Risk for disease spread

1. *illegal animal movements, and limited control thereof;*
2. *underreporting and late detection of SPGP occurrence;*



3. *biosecurity gaps on farms and particularly related to*
 - ✓ *trucks collecting lambs,*
 - ✓ *drivers selecting lambs and lambs returning to the farm flock after the selection process for slaughter,*
 - ✓ *no changing of clothes and shoes,*
 - ✓ *not proper cleanings and disinfection;*
 - ✓ *workers, wool shearers etc.;*
4. *delays in the outbreak management actions as regards depopulation, cleaning and disinfection.*



Recommendations on the strategy for eradication of SPGP in Spain

The recommendations of the previous EuVET visit (although addressed) remain relevant and should continue to be considered in the current epidemiological context.

The protection and surveillance zones around confirmed outbreaks should be at least equivalent in size to the latest zones and it should even be considered if they should not be enlarged if deemed necessary. Same applies for the duration these zones are implemented. The current surveillance zones should be merged and a common period of implementation should apply for the previous and the new outbreak, at least for the surveillance zone. The further restricted zone should be prolonged accordingly.

Animal movements without veterinary certificate can compromise the effectiveness of the veterinary measures imposed to control the disease. More support in the field by police or other competent authorities (e.g. SEPRONA) is highly recommended, to ensure a high level of control to prevent non-authorized animal movements.

In case of an outbreak – other epidemiologically linked farms (among others, but not limited to, recent contacts, ownership, family links, shared technique and materials) (independently of their location) must be considered as high risk and put under standstill for at least 45 days with strict surveillance in place. Sampling and testing of saliva should be performed in such farms in parallel with the clinical examinations.

Outbreak management and preliminary cleaning and disinfection must be performed as quickly as possible in accordance with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. The procedures must be closely followed and supervised on the spot by the competent veterinary authority. Every effort must be taken to try to reduce the overall time needed for the completion of cleaning and disinfection following disease confirmation.

Particular attention should be taken during cleaning, disinfection and waste removal of highly contaminated outbreaks due to the high amount of virus present.

The Veterinary Service should distribute clear instructions/leaflets/posters (particularly in restricted zones) explaining how to recognize the disease and information on the basic biosafety measures that need to be taken on farms

do not allow other trucks, vehicles to enter beyond the fence of the farm

avoid drivers/traders to be in direct contact with animals when selecting lambs unless all necessary biosecurity measure are in place (protective clothing, gloves);

everyone (owner, workers, wool shearers, vets) to change cloths/shoes when entering the farm

strict cleaning and disinfection of materials used inside the farm to be performed

cleaning before disinfection must be applied

wool shearers should be carefully selected, approved and supervised by the Competent veterinary authority and be provided with detailed biosecurity instructions, including cleaning and disinfection of their equipment, to prevent disease spread from affected or suspected farms;

Instructions should be issued on the disposal or possible use of the wool produced by the shearing.

Simulation exercise(s) are recommended to test the preparedness in case of detection of a TAD in a slaughterhouse.



The EU-VET team would like to thank all Spanish colleagues for their great support and help!

The working atmosphere during the mission was excellent. The colleagues from Spain gave all their support and assistance to facilitate a fruitful mission. The EUVET team wishes to thank all colleagues present in Madrid, Alcazar de San Juan and Tomelloso for their excellent contributions to the discussions which were undertaken in a very open and transparent manner.