

MINISTÈRE DE L'AGRICULTURE DE L'AGROALIMENTAIRE ET DE LA FORET

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

France

12 January 2016

















Outline of presentation

- Chronology of events
- Measures implemented
- Sanitary situation
 - Epidemiological situation
 - Knowledge on the viruses strains
 - Interpretation by Anses
- Adaptation of control measures
- Assessment of efficacity



















Chronology of events 24/11 – 2/12

- Confirmation of the first case, clinical suspicion, on the 24/11th in a hobby keeper → emergency response to an exotic disease
- Immediate implementation of protection zone of 3km radius, surveillance zone of 10 km
- Awareness of clinical surveillance, prohibition of bird meetings in Dordogne
- 2 additional outbreaks detected in Dordogne (serological surveillance and clinical) and identification of H5N1 and H5N2
 - → 2/12: adoption of supplementary restricted zone according to EU decision 2006/415 + restriction of international trade for all Dordogne




















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Chronology of events 2/12 – 11/12


 From 2/12 to 10/12 : additional strain of HPAI, discovery of HPAI in Landes + FPAI
 → 11/12 further restriction zones in Landes






Chronology of events 11/12 - 11/1

Restriction zones on 9 departements + communes of some departements





Total of 67 outbreaks
Situation looks more like an
enzootic disease than an exotic
recent extension
Management as emergency
response → overwhelming of
capacity
17/12 stop of systematic testing of
ducks sent to slaughterhouse

Population in the restricted zone

Zone	Gallinaceans	Palmipeds	Farmed game birds
Zone de protection (ZP)	803	1153	0
Zone de surveillance (ZS)	1768	2247	6
Zone de restriction hors ZP et ZS	5129	3700	29
Autre (reste du territoire continental)	48479	3347	420
Total	56179	10447	455

48 % (7100/(7700+7100)) of farms in the restricted zone: Palmipedes 68 % of French Palmipedes farms in the restricted zone (and 14 % of Gallinaceans farms)



Measures implemented

- Culling and disposal in outbreaks
- Cleaning and disinfection
- Securisation of transport
- Control of movements
- Epidemiological investigations
- Surveillance



















Culling and safe disposal

- Specialised company (GT Logistic) in 28 sites and 52 by other methods (euthanasia by veterinarians or close slaughterhouses, mostly for small flocks of finished ducks)
- Systematically
 - Supervision by DDPP
 - Protection of staff
 - Preliminary disinfection (VIRKON ND)
 - Collect of carcasses to rendering plant
- Human care: psychological support to farmers, advice for medical follow up





















Figures on culling

Green: GT Logistic = large units (mean 4500 ducks, median 1755)

Orange: slaughterhouse or vet = small units (mean 1000 ducks, median 805)




Days between confirmation and culling

Average: 5,9 days Median 3 days 75 % of flocks culled within 7 days

1811	Method	Geese	Ducks	Guinea Fowls	Chicken
	Other	4,078	49,140	130	1,430
	GT Logistic	965	72,610	9,200	32,406
	Total	5,043	121,750	9,330	33,836

Technical aspects for ducks



















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Cleaning and disinfection

Premises

- Preliminary aspersion of disinfectant
- Cleaning is the responsability of the farmer → assistance if difficulties
- Once cleaning, 2 steps of disinfection by local private companies using approved disinfectant (mostly ammonium) with at least 7 days between (2nd disinfection not necessary if preliminary done in

a cleaned place)

 Difficulties encountered for free ranging surfaces





















Cleaning and disinfection

- Manure and slurry
 - Manure: burnt, composted for 6 months, stacked with lime and covered for 42 days
 - Duck slurry → methanisation or quicklime to elevate pH up to 12 or stored for 60 days
- Restocking: minimum of 21 days of empty period and surveillance for 21 days (no restocking has yet started in outbreak)

















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Securisation of transport

- Instruction to avoid incoming vehicles in farms in protection / surveillance zones
- If not possible, organisation of tours from low risk to high risk and disinfection when living the high risk area
- When exemption for movement restriction, approval by the DDPP of the itinary

- Disinfection of vehicles
 - Use of built in disinfection units when existing
 - Carriable disinfection material more reliable in time



















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Control of movements

- Protection zone and surveillance zone
 - Interdiction of movements
 - Movements of day old chick/hatching eggs from zones allowed to restriction zone if inspection of hatchery and testing of breeder flock
 - Movements for slaughtering :
 - Initially derogations for slaughter after visit, sampling if clinical suspicion and systematic test for palmipeds
 - After assessement of virus non-zoonotic capacity, systematic testing of palmipeds suspended, maintenance of systematic clinical visits in protection zones
 - In any case caution for movement of animals (disinfection, control itinaries)



















Control of movements

Restriction zone

- No movement of poultry outside the zone except day old chicks in some conditions (inspection of hatcheries and test of breeder flocks + approval of MS if EU trade)
- Movements within the zone allowed with biosecurity measures for transport, cleaning and disinfection and minimal period before restocking



















Epidemiological investigations

Complex traceback of epidemiological links – done for 38 / 67

- For a single band of fattening ducks : one or more hatcheries and many breeder flocks
- For a single band of « finished » ducks : 3 to 14 « brother » flocks & 3 bands within 40 days
- Field teams overwhelmed with cullings, awareness and communication on measures and administrative tasks / difficulties to feed back with data reports
- Approach at the outbreak level combined with approach at the organisation level: analysis of flow, commercial links
 - Special attention to identify links outside the restriction zone
 - Traceback of breeder flocks



















Complex organisation



To very complex organisation





Surveillance modalities

Clinical surveillance

 Farmers and vets have to report any clinical suspicion of avian influenza.

Active surveillance:

- Clinical inspection (and sampling < 17th of December) of farms before any mouvements out of the restricted zones
- Visit of farms epidemiologically link to an outbreak of HPAI
- Inspection and sampling of farms in the protection and surveillance zones (including non commercial farms in protection zone)




Clinical surveillance




Facial oedema

Crédit Pr Jean-Luc GUERIN ENVT

Pancreatis







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Surveillance results (active surveillance)

Zone	Species	Number of farms with clinical inspection (and sampling)
Zone de protection	Gallineceans	54 - 7 % of farms (4)
	Palmipedes	105 - 9 % of farms (17)
Zone de surveillance	Gallineceans	150 - 8 % of farms (11)
	Palmipedes	509 - 23 % of farms (45)
Zone de restriction (hors ZP et ZS)	Gallineceans	426 - 8 % of farms (3)
	Palmipedes	263 - 7 % of farms (17)


Among the 86 farms with Palmipedes visited and sampled : 36 confirmed H5 HP (42 % of farms)




Number and geographical distribution of IA outbreaks in France January 8, 2016

129 suspicions:

- 45 negative results
- > 3 pending results
- 81 positive results
 - · 67 IAHP cases
 - · 14 IAFP cases



Number and geographical distribution of the french IA outbreaks January 8, 2016




 Several serotypes (H5HP N1, N2, N9) sometimes in the same flock

Type of suspicion (Origin)

	HP positive	FP positive	negative	Suspect	Total
Clinical suspicion	25	0	31	2	58
National system of active surveillance	3	4	0	0	7
Epidemiological link	3	2	11	0	16
Movements	36	7	1	1	45
No data		1	2		3
Total	67	14	45	3	129

- > 43% of the clinical suspicions are confirmed
- High level of contamination in the controlled zones

Repartition of the cases (IAHP and FP) depending on the type of production (commercial/private)



First results of the epidemiological investigations

- Specificity of the duck production for « foie gras »
 - Limited area (South West of France)
 - Short cycles of production (10-11 days)
 - Low number of birds/flock (around 1000)



- Very high level of movements (trucks, birds, persons)
- Number of epidemiological links +++
- Most of them in the restricted area (except for hatcheries)

Serological surveillance for H5 Avian Influenza viruses in domestic poultry since 2009

Not detected in:


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Serological surveillance for H5 Avian Influenza viruses in domestic poultry since 2009 Detected in (nb positive / nb tested):

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Mollard (gama)	3/12	4/20	1/18	0/18	0/20	0/14	0/15
Mallard (game)	25,0%	20,0%	5,6%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Meat ducks	3/55	2/74	0/74	0/76	0/82	2/35	0/31
Weat ducks	5,5%	2,7%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	5,7%	0,0%
Breeder ducks and	14/68	18/85	19/72	14/72	24/78	8/77	7/72
future breeders	20,6%	21,2%	26,4%	19,4%	30,8%	10,4%	9,7%
Ready for fatty liver	6/71	1/85	6/91	5/93	5/93	3/59	4/56
ducks	8,5%	1,2%	6,6%	5,4%	5,4%	5,1%	8,9%
Breeding geese and	4/11	6/13	2/19	2/16	4/16	5/35	5/28
future breeders	36,4%	46,2%	10,5%	12,5%	25,0%	14,3%	17,9%
Pheasant	1/29	1/48	0/39	0/37	0/34	0/19	0/20
riicasaiit	3,4%	2,1%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Guinea Fowl	/	1/60	0/54	0/56	0/49	0/65	0/57
Guillea i Owi		1,7%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%

Serological surveillance for H5 Avian Influenza viruses in domestic poultry in 2015

Detection of 16 seropositive poultry in 2015:



- Ready for fatty liver ducks (n=4)
- Breeder ducks & future breeders (n=7)
- Breeding geese & future breeders (n=5)



Risk factors identified

Galliniforms breeding sector seems secured (biosecurity measures regularly controlled towards salmonellosis)

Duck production concentrates the risk:

- At the fattening level biosecurity is weak
 - Cleaning and disinfection of premises and transports, no unique flocks, hygienisation of manure, human practices of biosecurity
 - Absence of systematic control of incoming animals
- At the breeder flocks level, biosecurity can be improved :
 - No systematic inspection of hatcheries
 - No qualification of parental flock status



















Distribution of duck production



70 % of the duck farms within the current restriction zone



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Adaptation of strategy of control to an unique situation

- Objective = Eradication
- No evidence of zoonotic capacity
- Silent disease in duck and the chicken/turkeys apparently not infected
- The situation to handle is not epizootic resulting from the introduction of an exotic virus → usual methods of control need to be adapted
- Rapidity of action versus sustainability
- Expected time to eradication 3 to 6 months




















Strategy to handle the disease

- To eradicate
 - Regulatory biosecurity measures in all poultry farms
 - Surveillance measures in all poultry sectors
 - Progressive planified eradication in the infected areas
- To prevent
 - Maintenance of biosecurity measures in all poultry farms
 - Qualification of breeders
 - Single database for owners registration and movements
 - Compartmentisation





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Biosecurity measures

- Single band of age
- Empty period
- Cleaning and disinfection
- Management of manure and slurry
- Protection of farms (surrounding, cleaning and disinfection, staff,...)
- Transport
- Education and awareness programme



















Progressive plannified depopulation

- Immediate culling of detected infected flocks
- Definition of smaller areas of management
 - Spontaneous depopulation of finished flocks without restocking
 - Management of transport to finishing unit and to slaughterhouse
 - Accelerated depopulation



















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Objectives of surveillance

- Challenge the free zone
 - Immediate investigation of epidemiological links and clinical suspicion
 - Plannified visits and systematic sampling in all breeder sectors if possible within 2 months (target prevalence limit of 1%)
 - Survey in other poultry sector
- Surveillance in restricted zone
 - Rapid visits and sampling in all breeder sectors
 - Tests for movement autorisation when requested
 - Assessement of status of flocks triggered by level of depopulation to lift the restriction zones
- Surveillance of wildlife
 - Collection and testing of found dead birds
 - Testing of animals collected in wildife clinics

















Assessment of efficacity

- Testing of flocks after restocking, for removal of protection zone, surveillance zone and restriction zone
- Implementation of qualification of breeder flocks and hatcheries
- Annual serological survey



















Conclusion

- Unprecedented situation
- Several non zoonotic viruses
- Allmost exclusive to palmipeds
 - Production particularly important in France
 - Production with sanitary weaknesses
- All the French stakeholders are committed to eradication



















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Thank you for your attention













