



Better Training for Safer Food *Initiative*

AFRICAN SWINE FEVER

BTSF

This presentation is delivered under contract with the Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency (<http://ec.europa.eu/chafea>). The content of this presentation is the sole responsibility of Opera S.u.r.l., the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Lombardia e Emilia Romagna and the State Food and Veterinary Service of Latvia and it can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency or any other body of the European Union. The Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency or any other body of the European Union will not be responsible under any circumstances for the contents of communication items prepared by the contractors.

Belgrade, Serbia 6-8/11/2018

The problem of having ASF in wild boar

- According to the EU legislation the size of the infected wild boar population area will be at least 200 sqkm
- The wild boar infected area will enforced for at least 24 months
- In the area the domestic pig population is under restriction (stand still, biosecurity, surveillance etc.) and goes immediately out of the market

Virus prevalence in infected wild boar population: **1-4,5%**

Sero-prevalence in hunted WB: **0,5-2%**


Incubation **3-5 days**

Lethality **90-95%**

70-80% found dead wild boar are virus

≈ **50 km/year** is the average speed, but the virus lasts also in old infected areas

The virus **spreads** through the **geographical continuity of the wild boar population** RATHER THAN of wild boar migration



Higher prevalence in summer: new born animals, insectes?

Lower prevalence in winter: virus survives in carcasses

Increasing prevalence: rutting period ?



ROLE OF INSECTS AND CARACASSES

NO TICKS

Maggots could increase contacts between wild boar and infected carcasses but they have been never positive to the virus (only DNA presence but no virus): enhanced summer transmission

Scavenging insects: long attraction for wild boar, increased probability of direct contact with infected carcasses

Carcasses: virus maintenance in the environment; direct transmission to the susceptible animals


Role of insects and carcasses no ticks

- **Maggots** could increase contacts between wild boar and infected carcasses but they have been never positive to the virus (only DNA presence but no virus): enhanced summer transmission
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
Risk of spread after introduction of the virus

- Delayed diagnosis
- Wild boar population size and density
- Forest connectivity
- Inappropriate hunting methodologies
- Lack of biosecurity measures applied during hunting
- Infected wild boar carcasses available for healthy wild boars
- Poaching

Geographical continuity



Winter feeding increases densities




Hunting and wild boar movement

- Drive hunting with dogs: increase of range size during the hunting season

Season	100% MCP				95% kernel				50% kernel			
	Median	Q ₃ -Q ₁	Mean	SE	Median	Q ₃ -Q ₁	Mean	SE	Median	Q ₃ -Q ₁	Mean	SE
Pre-hunting	80	104	88	25	66	156	98	39	4	14	10	3
Hunting	428	1360	825	358	221	696	457	192	23	68	45	16
Post-hunting	195	544	358	151	189	488	284	99	20	88	45	20

Home range displacements during the hunting season (up to 15 km)



Eur J Wildl Res (2010) 56:307–318
DOI 10.1007/s10344-009-0314-z

ORIGINAL PAPER

Do intensive drive hunts affect wild boar (*Sus scrofa*) spatial behaviour in Italy? Some evidences and management implications

Laura Scillitani · Andrea Monaco · Silvano Toso




Driven hunt with dogs – effective method to reduce the population density


Density dependent spread

- The number of NEW INFECTED wild boar is proportional to the wild boar population size
- The duration of the epidemic is proportional to the wild boar population size


Poland: tendency to spread within areas with wild boar density > 1 individual/km²



2014 – 30 cases






2015 – 53 cases



2016 – 28 cases

Metssea asustustihedus jahipiirkonniti
(isendit 1000 ha jahimaa kohta)



Density of wild boars (individuals per 10 km² of hunting ground) in hunting districts by hunters estimations (census) in spring 2016.

ASF in wild boar

A density dependent transmission during summer-autumn (new born and adult animals)...insects?

Virus survival during winter with few (or many) infected carcasses according to the local ecological situation

A mixed transmission: density dependent and frequency dependent => NO THRESHOLD



ASF in wild boar

The question is:

Which is the wild boar density that prevent the contact between a susceptible wild boar with an infected carcass?

An ASF virus will overwinter in a infected carcass.....3-4 months...and the virus will appear again during the late spring in alive susceptible individuals

EU STRATEGY

(SEE EFSA, 2015)

- ◆ Reduce the wild boar population size through targeted hunting of adult females
- ◆ Detection of – at least - 50% infected carcasses and their safe disposal
- ◆ Ban of winter/sustaining artificial feeding


Strategy applied - for at least - 100 km in front of the detected case

It is a medium term strategy that accepts the presence of the virus for a certain number of years

EU strategy see EFSA, 2015)

- ◆ Reduce the wild boar population size through targeted hunting of adult females
- ◆ Detection of – at least - 50% infected carcasses and their safe disposal
- ◆ Ban of winter/sustaining artificial feeding
- **Strategy applied - for at least - 100 km in front of the detected case**
- **It is a medium term strategy that accepts the presence of the virus for a certain number of years**

The 4 phases of a transmissible disease



Introduction phase

- An infectious animal (sandwich, infected blood etc.) arrives in a free area;
- Difficult to be prevented;
- Fence the border?
- Hunt every wild boar crossing the border?
- What else?
- FEASEABILITY? SUSTAINABILITY?


REALITY: the virus arrives

Saint Severino, protector of borders (410-482)



INVASION

N. cases



The invasion phase initiates when

- A minimum number of susceptible wild boar is available for the virus
- This specific minimum number is defined as: **Host threshold density for infection invasion (N_t);**
- The infection of this minimum number of susceptible – available - hosts is the starting point of any epidemic

What about this Threshold?

- N_t exists when the infection spreads in a density dependent pattern;
- N_t is a deterministic threshold (a precise N. of individuals...that could be expressed also by density i.e. 0,5/1000ha);
- It is simply the number of WB, no gender and age classes have to be considered/known;
- N_t addresses preventive measures aimed in reducing the wild boar population size **BEFORE** the arrival of the infection; **FREE AREAS**

Is it possible to prevent the invasion phase?

In **free areas** it is **COULD** be possible to prevent the invasion phase (and thus avoiding the epidemic) managing the wild boar below the **THRESHOLD DENSITY (Nt)**

EFSA, 2017 through a stochastic model

Nt and percentages


- The most widespread mistake is to set a “average” percentage of animals that has to be eliminated;
- 70% (rabies derived) is considered a magic number;
- 70% of 10WB/Kmsq = **3** left in the forest
- 70% of 4WB/kmsq = **1** left
- 70% of wild boar estimated in March = **35%** in winter (usual hunting bag!!!)

Can we prevent ASF managing the wild boar population at the threshold?

- Deterministic (exact) N_t estimation;
- Alternative approach: EFSA (stochastic)
- Precise host population size estimates:
- $Z_{lin} \Rightarrow$ initial estimate 2WB/kmsq Final estimate 9WB/kmsq
- Feasibility
- BY NOW ALL ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED WHEN THE VIRUS ARRIVES: NO PREVENTION....BUT ...REACTION

Epidemic

N. cases



The epidemic phase

- The infection spreads in the wild boar population: the chain of infection is fully activated;
- The intensity and the duration of the epidemic results from the interaction between the two populations (host and infection agent) driven by wild boar population size and density;

Epidemic phase: considerations

- Wildlife diseases are detected during the epidemic phase and rarely (if ever) during the invasion phase; **1 detected positive = 3-6 in the forest**
- Countries ask for a threshold to be reached during the epidemic:
- BUT during the epidemic TECHNICALLY THERE IS NOT A THRESHOLD

Is the epidemic phase manageable?

NO!!!

- The infection rate is always higher than any hunting rate
- Hunting will favour an artificial endemic evolution of the infection with **VIRUS PREVALENCE HIGHER THAN NATURAL**
- Hunting will increase the probability to geographically spread the disease (100 year of wildlife diseases management) field studies, ;

EPIDEMIC PAHSE

- Do nothing
- PASSIVE surveillance
- Do not get tired of surveillance;
- Be accurate when collecting data;
- Be patient and wait the end of the epidemic revealed by surveillance;

Probability to eradicate

$$p = (1/R_0)^{N.\text{infectious}}$$


Zlin, $R_0 \sim 1,5$

$$p = (1/1,5)^1 = \mathbf{67\%} \quad (\mathbf{1} \text{ infected wild boar})$$


$$p = (1/1,5)^5 = 13\%$$

$$p = (1/1,5)^{10} = \mathbf{2\%} \quad (\mathbf{10} \text{ inf. wild boars})$$

ASF is not a simple density dependent infection.
The ultimate persistence of the virus is guaranteed by carcasses
The virus itself kills most of the animals




Rarely the infection fades out spontaneously a lucky but rare event



Epidemic evolved endemic

N. cases



Why an epidemic evolves endemic?

A WILD BOAR CRITICAL COMMUNITY SIZE (CCS) is still present;

- It is the minimum size of a population with its specific demographic parameters that allows virus persistence;
- IT IS NOT a NUMBER of individuals...is a SUB-POPULATION





CCS: depends on:

- **Virus** transmissibility, lethality and recovery
- **Host** population density, fertility, turn over, age and gender classes, management (including feeding, hunting quotas and seasons etc. etc.)

Mathematically the CCS is the population size at which the infection has **50% probability** to fade out spontaneously;


Critical community size

- It cannot be calculated but estimated through simulations that consider all the necessary parameter values (when available);
- It is a probabilistic estimate with some mathematical instability;
- Can work in one area and not in the neighbouring one;
- 100% eradication probabilities coincides with host eradication;



Each one of the dot is a small population
In each of these small populations the virus
could be
Independently maintained
Contacts among them favour the
persistence of the virus

An example




CCS size

ASF survives in small population when :

- Population fertility rate is high;
- Carcasses left in the forest;
- Population turn-over is high



Summarizing (OIE handbook)




$< Nt$ (no spread)



$> CCS$



$< CCS$





$> Nt$ (spread)

ASF: why time has been needed

- Unexpected African disease in North of Europe;
- Spontaneous fade out in wild boar was expected
- Technical difficulties
- New infections = (direct contact) + (contact with carcasses)
- No available scientific literature covers such complex disease....it is new transmission model!!!!


Until now the only area where ASF has been (apparently) eradicated in wild boar in the EU



Higest risk fenced area

- Elektrický ohradník
 - Pachový ohradník
 - Díly půdních bloků - nesklizené
 - Červená zóna (zamořená oblast)
 - Hranice katastrálního území
- 0 0.5 1 2 3 km

Low risk area
Intensive hunting area
5305 hunted wild boars
at 13 October 2017



High risk area
(fenced plus buffer
Designed according
wild boar home range

ZAMOŘENÁ OBLAST
AFRICKÝ MOR PRASAT

NAŘÍZENÍ č. j. SVS/2017/108438 ze dne 11. 9. 2017

ZÁKAZ VSTUPU

PROBÍHÁ LOV



NAKAŽENÝCH

DIVOKÝCH PRASAT






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
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Digitální ortofoto
Mapový systém: ČSRS (EPSG:15490) a spheroid: WGS84
Mapový zdroj: ČÚMÚZ (http://portal.cuzk.cz)

Low risk area
Intensive hunting area
5305 hunted wild boars
at 13 October 2017



High risk area
(fenced plus buffer
Designed according
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Control strategy in wild boar

Outside Infected area: =>
intensive hunting
(including economic incentives)


Infected area: outside core area
Targeted hunting of adult females
Hunting under biosecurity procedures
All shot animals rendered (not home taking)

Buffer: yearly wild boar home range

Core area defined by passive surveillance (dead infected wild boar)


Core and buffer area: ban of hunting, Forbidden entrance for general public
Active search of wild boar carcasses ONLY







17-10-2018

- positive (new)
- positive
- ▲ negative (new)
- ▲ negative
- in progress
- ▭ infected zone





Peste Porcine Africaine Limites des différentes zones (AGW 12/10/2018)



Take at home message

- Threshold is a **preventive** measure
- During the Epidemic/endemic eradication is aimed in removing the **last infectious** animal
- The probability to remove the last infectious animal is LOW during the **epidemic** (when the virus is detected)
- During the endemic phase, the probability to eliminate the last infectious animal is higher but has to be achieved in each maintenance Critical Community
- The virus **naturally reaches its minimum prevalence** but carcasses make specific the epidemiological landscape of ASF
- During the endemic phase, the **removal of carcasses** is probably more important than any WB density reduction



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