



HPAI H5(N8) in Member States in poultry, captive and wild birds


(01/10/2016-01/03/2017)

DG Health and Food Safety



HPAI H5N8 in wild birds, captive birds and in poultry 2016-2017

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Legend


Outbreaks from 01/01/2017 until now

- ★ Highly pathogenic avian influenza in captive birds
- ★ Highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild birds
- Highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry

Outbreaks in 2016

- ★ Highly pathogenic avian influenza in captive birds
- ★ Highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild birds
- Highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry


2017 - SANTE GIS
Last update: 02 March 2017



NORTH AMERICA

EUROPE

Broad migration flows of ducks across Europe




NORTH AMERICA

**Integration:
key migratory
corridors for
waterbirds in
Europe**


Mixing with
indigenous
species!

W



AFRICA

Phylogeny of the HA gene of H5N8 HPAI



The current viruses form a single cluster that can be clearly distinguished from the previous EU incursion (2014-15)

Member State	Wild birds	Poultry	Captive birds
Germany	527	64	14
France	44	386	1
Italy	5	9	
The Netherlands	45	9	6
Belgium	2		1
The United Kingdom	21	10	
Ireland	10		
Denmark	43	1	1
Greece	9	5	
Spain	2	10	
Portugal	1		
Austria	47	2	
Finland	13		1
Sweden	23	3	2
The Czech Republic	33	36	1
Hungary	55	234	5
Poland	67	60	
Slovenia	40		
Bulgaria	13	67	2
Lithuania	2		
Romania	66	15	2
Slovakia	56	7	2
Croatia	12	7	
Total	1136	925	38


Number of HPAI H5(N8) outbreaks by Member State

01/10/2016
to 03/03/2017



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Number of HPAI H5(N8) outbreaks by Member State as from 01/10/2016 to 01/03/2017






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Member State	Primary	Secondary	Rate2nd/1st
Germany	56	8	0.14
France	360	26	0.07
Italy	8	1	0.13
The Netherlands	9		0
The United Kingdom	8	2	0.25
Denmark	1		0
Greece	5		0
Spain	1	9	9
Austria	2		0
Sweden	3		0
The Czech Republic	36		0
Hungary	40	194	4.85
Poland	57	3	0.05
Bulgaria	16	51	3.19
Romania	13	2	0.15
Slovakia	7		0
Croatia	3	4	1.33
Total	625	300	0.48


**Number of
HPAI H5(N8)
outbreaks in
poultry by
Member State
(01/10/2016 to
03/03/2017)**

Comparison "2005/2006 H5N1" with "2016-2017 H5N(8)" epidemics



Comparison "2005/2006 H5N1" with "2016-2017 H5N8" epidemics

Nr of susceptible birds



Species	Number of events*	%
Duck spp	85	19%
Tufted duck (<i>Aythya fuligula</i>)	68	15%
Unspecified	58	13%
Gulls spp	41	9%
Swan spp	41	9%
Mute swan (<i>Cygnus olor</i>)	38	8%
Herring gull (<i>Larus argentatus</i>)	23	5%
Goose spp.	21	5%
Eurasian wigeon (<i>Anas penelope</i>)	18	4%
Black-headed gull (<i>Chroicocephalus ridibundus</i>)	14	3%
Great black-backed gull (<i>Larus marinus</i>)	11	2%
Great crested grebe (<i>Podiceps cristatus</i>)	10	2%
White-tailed eagle (<i>Haliaeetus albicilla</i>)	10	2%
Whooper swan (<i>Cygnus cygnus</i>)	7	2%
Common buzzard (<i>Buteo buteo</i>)	7	1%
Common pochard (<i>Aythya farina</i>)	6	1%
Mallard (<i>Anas platyrhynchos</i>)	6	1%
Heron spp.	5	1%
Common coot (<i>Fulica atra</i>)	4	1%
Little grebe (<i>Tachybaptus ruficollis</i>)	4	1%
White stork (<i>Ciconia ciconia</i>)	4	<1%
Common magpie (<i>Pica pica</i>)	3	1%
Peregrine falcon (<i>Falco peregrinus</i>)	3	1%
Eurasian teal (<i>Anas crecca</i>)	2	<1%
Common gull (<i>Larus canus</i>)	2	1%
Red-crested pochard (<i>Netta rufina</i>)	2	<1%
Buzzard spp	2	<1%
Emu (<i>Dromaius novaehollandiae</i>)	2	<1%
Hooded crow (<i>Corvus cornix</i>)	2	<1%
Great cormorant (<i>Phalacrocorax carbo</i>)	1	<1%
Lesser white-fronted goose (<i>Anser erythropus</i>)	2	<1%
Greylag goose (<i>Anser anser</i>)	1	<1%
Shelduck (<i>Tadorna tadorna</i>)	1	<1%
Grey heron (<i>Ardea cinerea</i>)	1	<1%
Common moorhen (<i>Gallinula chloropus</i>)	1	<1%
Lesser black-backed gull (<i>Larus fuscus</i>)	1	<1%
Common goldeneye (<i>Bucephala clangula</i>)	1	<1%
Common eider (<i>Somateria mollissima</i>)	1	<1%
Eagle (spp. unspecified)	1	<1%
Green sandpiper (<i>Tringa ochropus</i>)	1	<1%
Common tern (<i>Sterna hirundo</i>)	1	<1%
Carrion crow (<i>Corvus corone</i>)	1	<1%
Common raven	1	<1%
Curlew (<i>Numenius spp.</i>)	1	<1%
Wigeon spp.	1	<1%
Eurasian Eagle-Owl (<i>Bubo bubo</i>)	1	<1%
Eurasian Sparrowhawk (<i>Accipiter nisus</i>)	1	<1%
Eurasian white fronted goose (<i>Anser albifrons</i>)	1	<1%
Owl spp.	1	<1%
Northern hawk (<i>Surnia ulula</i>)	1	<1%

High Risk Species not detected positive to ate in the current epizootic
Black-necked Grebe (<i>Podiceps nigricollis</i>)
Bewick's Swan (<i>Cygnus columbianus</i>)
Bean Goose (<i>Anser fabalis</i>)
Pink-footed Goose (<i>Anser brachyrhynchus</i>)
Greater White-fronted Goose (<i>Anser albifrons albifrons</i>)
Canada Goose (<i>Branta Canadensis</i>)
Barnacle Goose (<i>Branta leucopsis</i>)
Brent Goose (<i>Branta bernicla</i>)
Red-breasted Goose (<i>Branta ruficollis</i>)
Gadwall (<i>Anas strepera</i>)
Northern Pintail (<i>Anas acuta</i>)
Garganey (<i>Anas querquedula</i>)
Northern Shoveler (<i>Anas clypeata</i>)
Marbled Teal (<i>Marmaronetta angustirostris</i>)
Smew (<i>Mergus albellus</i>)
Black Kite (<i>Milvus migrans</i>)
Red Kite (<i>Milvus milvus</i>)
Eurasian Marsh Harrier (<i>Circus aeruginosus</i>)
Rough-legged Buzzard (<i>Buteo lagopus</i>)
Common Kestrel (<i>Falco tinnunculus</i>)
Purple Swamphen (<i>Porphyrio porphyrio</i>)
Eurasian Golden Plover (<i>Pluvialis apricaria</i>)
Northern Lapwing (<i>Vanellus vanellus</i>)
Ruff (<i>Philomachus pugnax</i>)
Black-tailed Godwit (<i>Limosa limosa</i>)

Wild bird species reported infected with H5N8(N5) since October 2016 to Mid-January 2017

*Note: Several events involved different species
Those in bold are on the list of higher risk species

¹ Rounded down

Legislation (1)



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Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/263 of 14/02/2017 on risk mitigating and reinforced biosecurity measures and early detection systems in relation to risks posed by wild birds for the transmission of HPAI viruses to poultry

Need to address virus introduction into poultry flocks through direct and indirect contacts with wild birds

Member States have to **identify and review "high risk areas"** as well as the the time period for which risks persist and holdings at increased risk for HPAI infection based on the:

- Outbreak situation in poultry and wild birds on their territory, nearby Member States or third countries
- Risk factors for **virus introduction**: location of holdings close to water bodies where wild birds gather during migration, open air holdings
- Risk factors for **virus spread**: density and type of holdings, intensity of movements of poultry, persons, vehicles and trade patterns
- Risk assessments by EFSA or national and international bodies

Legislation (2)



In "high risk areas" risk mitigation measures shall be taken for the time needed:

It is prohibited to:

- keep poultry in the open air
- use water from open surfaces
- provide feed that was stored unprotected from birds or other animals
- gather poultry or captive birds at markets, shows and exhibitions
- use decoy birds of the orders Anseriformes and Charadriiformes for hunting

Derogations are possible provided Member States can ensure that all measures are taken to prevent virus spread, e.g. protect poultry with nets or roofs from contacts with wild birds, feeding and watering inside

Legislation (3)



- Member States must introduce or reinforce early detection systems aimed at rapid reporting by the owners to the competent authority of:
 - drop in feed and water intake and in egg production
 - any sign of avian influenza in poultry holdings
 - an observed mortality rate and any clinical sign or post-mortem lesion suggesting HPAI virus presence
- variation of these parameters in different poultry species and production types as well as by the virus characteristics must be taken into account
- Wild bird surveillance according to the guidelines laid down in Decision 2010/367/EU must be enhanced
- Sectors are very diverse - detailed descriptions on biosecurity or thresholds for early detection should be avoided in legislation
- Applicable until 30/06/2018 - to be reviewed in the light of EFSA's scientific opinion on AI available in 09/2017



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EFSA's work on avian influenza

Following the 2014/15 HPAI epidemic the Commission requested EFSA to **assess the risk for HPAI H5(N8) introduction into EU poultry** and the suitability of EU legislation on biosecurity, surveillance in wild birds and poultry and zoning

Scope was enlarged to deal in particular with **mutation from low pathogenic avian influenza to HPAI viruses** and the differences in the epidemiology

In 12/2016 EFSA issued a statement on the current epidemic anticipating certain replies to the mandate

Data collection from current outbreaks in co-operation with the EU Reference Laboratory

Close co-operation with ECDC on the zoonotic aspects



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Influenza A(H7N9) – China

- In **March 2013**, a novel avian influenza A(H7N9) virus is detected in patients in China, which is a **LPAI virus strain in poultry**.
- As of 28/02/2017, 1 223 laboratory-confirmed cases have been reported to WHO, including at least 397 deaths.
- The recent cases correspond to a fifth wave, with 425 cases reported since October 2016.
- On 18/02 China reports **HPAI H7N9** from samples at bird markets in Guangdong province to the OIE
- On 27/02 WHO reports sequencing results from virus isolated from two previous cases of human infection with A(H7N9) virus from Guangdong province. Changes at the cleavage site of the HA gene are suggestive of being highly pathogenic to poultry.
- No autochthonous cases have been reported outside China.
- The majority of recently reported human cases are associated with exposure to infected live poultry or contaminated environments, including live bird markets.
- Information to date suggests that these viruses do not transmit easily from human to human and the information does not support sustained human-to-human transmission.
- Close monitoring and updated risk assessments: <http://ecdc.europa.eu>



Legislation on Regionalisation

- First Decision in relation to HPAI H5N8 in Hungary published on 10/11/2016.
- Decisions shall ensure transparency and safe trade between disease free areas of Member States and to third countries.
- The establishing of the areas under restrictions aims at preventing any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union and to avoid unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries.
- Due to the further evolution, seven further decisions for specific affected Member States
- Consolidated Decision (EU) 2016/2122 - amended six times since
- New consolidated Decision (EU) 2017/247 was published on 11/02, next amendment PAFF 2-3/03.
- It will refer to **HPAI**, as **HPAI H5N5** detections in wild birds (NL, HR, SI, PL, EL, CZ) and in Germany in poultry (3 linked farms).

EU Veterinary Emergency Team (CVET)

Expert missions to:

- Hungary 19-21 December 2016
- Bulgaria 16-19 January 2017



HPAI H5N8 situation in third countries

- **Ukraine:** Regionalisation approved by Com.Impl. Reg. 2017/193 for Ukraine, maybe reduce size of the regionalisation
- **Russia:** Several regions affected, further information requested
- **Israel:** imports suspended, no request for regionalisation
- **former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia:** suspension of egg and poultry meat imports, anyway no approved establishments
- **Serbia:** only heat treated poultry meat products
- **Bosnia–Herzegovina:** no imports
- **Montenegro:** only wild birds positive: HP H5N5
- **USA:** only wild birds Montana HP H5N2

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON MATERIAL TRANSFER

МЕМОРАНДУМ О ВЗАИМОПОНИМАНИИ ОТНОСИТЕЛЬНО ОБМЕНА МАТЕРИАЛАМИ

THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING is made this 19th day of September by and between, The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs of Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR ("the Secretary of State") acting through the Animal and Plant Health Agency - APHA (EU Reference laboratory for avian influenza and Newcastle disease [EURL]), Addlestone, Surrey, United Kingdom (hereinafter called "the Provider" or "the Recipient") and The Russian Federal State-Financed Governmental Institution "Federal Centre for Animal Health" - FGBI ARRIAH (Reference laboratory for avian influenza and Newcastle disease of the Russian Federation), 600901 Yur'evets, Vladimir, Russia (hereinafter called "the Provider" or "the Recipient").

Exchange of HPAI and ND virus isolates
from initial and significant epidemiological events in
poultry farms between the EURL and the Russian NRL.
Dispatch handled by the EURL.

More information:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/animal-diseases/control-measures/avian-influenza_en

Thank you for the attention!