Foot-and-Mouth Disease
EUVET mission to Brandenburg and Berlin Germany

(15-17 January 2025)

Team: A.-E. Füssel (Team leader), T. Alexandrov (Bulgaria), K. Depner (Germany)

Providing on-the-spot assistance

- most suitable FMD eradication measures
- scientific, technical, managerial aspects
- preparedness and surveillance in domestic and wild cloven-hoofed animals

- Are the FMD control measures in place in Germany adequate and effective
- Are the FMD control measures being applied in Brandenburg and Berlin sufficient to prevent spread of FMD within and outside the restricted zones, including biosecurity measures
- Which additional measures are necessary to detect possible further infected premises or to detect possible infection in susceptible wild animals, including surveillance and testing of hunted animals
- Are biosecurity measures applied adequate to protect establishments keeping listed species within the restriction zones

Eine Landkarte vom Bundesland Brandenburg

Auf dieser Karte sehen Sie die Grenzen der 14 Landkreise in Brandenburg und die wichtigsten Städte.



Protection zone (red)

Surveillance zone (blue)

Berlin-Brandenburg Border (black)


Unbenannte Karte
FMD
Legende
Kleingartenverein "Mehrow eV"
Merkmal 1
BORNICKE
WEESOW
Panketal
HIRSCHFELDE
BUCH
Werneuchen
WESENDAHL
WEGENDORF
ROTER HOF
KAROW
FRANZOSISCH BUCHHOLZ
BLUMBERG
KRUMMENSEE
BEZIRK PANKOW
Ahrensfelde
Fredersdorfer Mühlenfließ, Langes Luch und...
Strausberg
Altlandsberg
Südostniederbarnimer Weiherketten
BRUCHMÜHLE
EGGERSDORF
WEISSENSEE
HONOW
MARZAHN-MITTE
HELLERSDORF
Petershagen/ Eggersdorf
PRENZLAUER BERG
BEZIRK LICHTENBERG
Neuenhagen bei Berlin
BEZIRK MARZAHN-HELLERSDORF
LICHTENBERG
Hoppegarten
HENNICKENDORF
Fredersdorf-Vogelsdorf
Niederungssystem des Neuenhagener...
BIESDORF
MAHLSDORF
DAHLWITZ-HOPPEGARTEN
Rüdersdorf bei Berlin
HERZFELDE
Schöneiche bei Berlin
NEUKÖLLN
FRIEDRICHSHAGEN
Woltersdorf
Google Earth
6 km
N

This area was fenced on 17.1.2025 as suggested by EUVET

The operator reported that the calves regularly escaped through the fence. According to him the animals are then on the farm's own alfalfa field or rarely move away, maximum 100 metres, from the pasture and then come back. They do not come onto external terrain. The last time this is said to have happened was before Christmas.

Checks on establishments keeping listed species (situation 20.01.2025)



Virological and serological investigations (situation 20.01.2025)



Restriction zones in Berlin

Lage Berlin II



Surveillance zone (Berlin)

35 establishments, 678 animals of listed species:
182 bovine, 26 pigs, 317 sheep, 133 goats, 10 farmed game, 10 camelides

Zahlen bezogen auf Betriebe	eingeleitet	beendet	gesamt
Gesamtzahl Betriebe	x	x	35
klinische Untersuchungen	11	24	35
Probenahme Virologie	11	24	35
Probenahme Serologie	11	24	35
Laboruntersuchung	läuft-	läuft-	läuft-
epidemiologische Ermittlungen	11	24	35

Investigation of an international movement

- 20.12.2024, 2 Sika deer from Warszaw (Confined- Rum)
- 04.01.2025, one died after clinical disease
  - 06.01.2025 post mortem
  - 13.01.2025 virologically negative
- 14.01.2025, second deer sampled for serology

Epidemiological inquiry

- 1 buffalo from the outbreak farm and 1 cow from the second epidemiological unit of that farm were slaughtered on 3 and 4 December 2024 for human consumption, including AM and PM investigation, a piece of buffalo meat has been traced for testing
- 2 adult buffaloes suddenly died on 05.01.2025 and were disposed of (rendering) without testing !
- 1 adult animal died on 06.01.2025 and was PCR positive but sero-negative
- 11 buffalo culled on 10.01.2025 were serologically positive for FMDV and 7 of them were positive in a PCR for FMDV
- With an incubation period of approx. 3-7 days and the antibody formation approx. 7-10 days after infection, FMDV can be expected in the herd approx. 7-14 days before the first clinical symptoms, albeit unspecific, were observed on 01.01.2025
- Recognizing the uncertainty about the first two dead buffalo, the entry period was estimated between **15 and 31 December 2024**

Main conclusions and recommendations

Overall disease control strategy

- The mission team did not identify major shortcomings in the overall disease control strategy in Brandenburg and Berlin;
- The team noted that a high level of coordination between Brandenburg and Berlin, but also between the various districts in those affected landers, is required because the control measures are applied through regional and local disease control centres established within and not across the administrative structures;
- There was no need to activate the crisis centres for the reason of FMD, since those centres had been activated due to ASF in the area;
- The regional and local disease control centres are of a high standard, well equipped and staffed;
- The team noted the valuable assistance provided by the National Reference Laboratory (FLI) and the regional laboratory in Frankfurt/O;
- However, the team considers that there was a need for a coordinated and harmonised disease control strategy for the affected area that considers the overall epidemiological situation regardless of administrative boundaries;

Main conclusions and recommendations

- According to available information there is no indication that the virus was introduced into the establishment through movements of animals, persons, equipment or vehicles.
- The scope of the hunting strategy of wild animals is largely determined by the needs to control ASF and is being carried out in the framework of the established control measures for ASF. Samples obtained from wildboar shot and found dead should be tested for FMD.
- Although wild boar was not sighted in the immediate vicinity of the outbreak farm, their role as a potential vector should not be underestimated due to their prevalence in urban areas. Increased sampling and testing of wild boar, also in in the suburbs of Berlin is highly recommended.
- Since roe deer has been observed on the pasture and in its vicinity, it is recommended to subject all carcasses of roe deer hunted or found dead in the restricted zones to a test for the detection of FMDV and antibody.
- Reducing susceptible wildlife to zero in the area at risk seems an objective difficult to reach and most likely inappropriate. Instead, kept animals of listed species should be protected by adequate and reinforced biosecurity measures with particular emphasis on outdoor holdings.

Main conclusions and recommendations

Surveillance

- Due to the undetermined origin of the infection and ways of introduction, and taking into account possible risks of contamination of the environment, frequent and regular visits to establishments keeping animals of listed species shall be carried out, taking into account also the principles of risk-based surveillance.
- Flocks of travelling sheep observed outside the surveillance zone should be tested prior to or at entry into barns for lambing.
- Surveillance should primarily monitor the spread of FMD. This requires a well-designed surveillance strategy, which should be coordinated by an expert group at central level for the whole restricted area.
- Transport of kept terrestrial animals of listed species should be reduced to the minimum and in accordance with established biosafety rules. In this context it would have been preferred to maintain an adapted “stand still” beyond 17.1.2025 at least until the essential investigations already initiated had been completed with satisfactory results.

The EU-VET team would like to thank all colleagues In Germany for their support and assistance.

The EU-VET team experienced a fruitful and cooperative working atmosphere during the mission.