HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA

DISEASE SITUATION

ANIMAL HEALTH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
11 JUNE 2024

European Commission,
DG Health and Food Safety
Unit G2 – Animal Health

HPAI in Europe in birds in 2020 – 2024

Oct 2020 – Sept 2021



Oct 2021 – Sept 2022



Oct 2022 – Sept 2023



Oct 2023 – May 2024



Virus spread with wild birds in all parts of Europe

Recurrent clusters in poultry in certain areas with high density of certain poultry production

European Commission

First week of June comparison

2023



2024



European Commission

Summary of HPAI epidemic seasons in figures

2021-2022:
the most severe HPAI epidemic season ever experienced by EU with the highest number of outbreaks in poultry and affected poultry

2022–2023:
even with **higher number** of outbreaks **in wild birds, less poultry outbreaks** (improved biosecurity and preventive measures e.g. reduced density in high risk areas)

2023 – 2024:
less number of **outbreaks** in wild birds and poultry
vaccinated poultry (**ducks**) **in France**



* Up to 22 May 2024

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Graphics of the HPAI epidemics in the EU

Weekly number of outbreaks in 2021-2024



Weekly number of poultry in outbreaks in 2020-2024



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HPAI H5N1 detection in mammals in Europe

In **wild** mammals, with focus on EU



In **domestic** mammals in the EU



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Mutation marker of HPAI viruses in different hosts in Europe

- To date, **no key mutations** associated to the switch in the virus binding preference
- 99 % of the H5 **HPAI viruses** in Europe **continue to be binding to avian type receptors**



Source: European Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza

EU rules for HPAI in animals of mammalian species

SURVEILLANCE:

- **part of the Union Surveillance Programme** (USP) for avian influenza
- **in all** Member States **when** these animals may be **a risk for animal and human health**
- **guidance of EU Reference Laboratory for avian influenza** for sampling and diagnosis, **including** for **genetic characterization** of viruses

MEASURES:

- may be classified as **emerging disease (Art. 6 of AHL)**
- **immediately reported** to the Commission and other Member States (Art. 257 (2) of AHL)
- **emergency measures**: movement restrictions of animals and products from affected farms; surveillance and traceability; can go as strict as for HPAI in poultry (e.g. culling/disposal of all animals in the affected farm, restricted zone, etc.) (Art. 257 (2) of AHL)
- Commission safeguard measures possible if needed (Art. 259 of AHL)



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HPAI situation worldwide



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HPAI events in ruminants in the USA

Three separate events:

- **One** detection **in goats** kept in a poultry farm affected by an HPAI outbreak
- **One** detection **in alpacas** kept in a poultry farm affected by an HPAI outbreak
- **Multiple**(86) detections **in dairy cows in 10 states**: Texas, Kansas, Michigan, New Mexico, Idaho, Ohio, North Carolina, South Dakota, Colorado, Wyoming

HPAI viruses detected:

- H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, a **Eurasian/North American reassortant**
- **never detected in Europe**

HPAI detections in dairy cows in the USA

USDA measures and recommendations

USDA Federal Order:

- testing for H5N1 before interstate movement of lactating dairy cattle
- no lactating dairy cattle positive for H5N1 virus may move interstate
- producers and/or states to submit epidemiological investigation and contact tracing information for herds with positive H5N1
- laboratories and state veterinarians must report any dairy cattle with positive H5N1 PCR results or positive influenza A serology

Measures in the affected farms:

- affected cows to be isolated from other animals
- milk from impacted animals is being diverted or destroyed, does not enter the food supply
- pasteurization is required for any milk entering interstate commerce

Recommendations to producers and veterinarians to prevent the spread:

- minimize dairy cattle movements
- not moving sick or exposed animals
- upholding good biosecurity practices
- testing animals before necessary movement

ECDC/EFSA risk assessment

In the **latest** joint **ECDC/EFSA/EURL monitoring report**:

- **Risk of infection** from the circulating HPAI A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses as **low for the general population** and **low-to moderate for** those with activities that expose them to infected animals or a contaminated environment (e.g. **occupationally exposed to infected animals**).

Facts considered:

- Detections in **Europe were much lower compared to the same period in previous years** (both in poultry and wild birds). Very few detections reported in mammals.
- **70% of worldwide outbreaks in poultry and almost all outbreaks in mammals** were reported from the US
- **Very few** reports of **detections in wild birds from the US**
- **Spillover events** from wild birds to mammals are likely to be **associated with heavily contaminated environments**
- **High passive and active surveillance** for HPAI viruses **in the EU**
- A(H5N1) **viruses isolated from dairy cattle** in the current US outbreak **have never been detected in Europe** and are **unlikely to be present**

Thank you

Slide xx: element concerned, source: e.g. Fotolia.com; Slide xx: element concerned, source: e.g. iStock.com

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