



Department
for Environment
Food & Rural Affairs



Animal &
Plant Health
Agency

Update on HPAI H5N8 in the United Kingdom


PAFF Committee, 5th December 2014

Presented by: Jane Clark

- Update on the Infected Premises
- Tracings
- Surveillance in the PZ/SZ
- Wild bird surveillance/risk
- Conclusion and next steps

The Infected Premises

6000 indoor breeding ducks
in Nafferton, East Yorkshire



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Update on the Infected Premises

- Assessment of the probability of infection in the other flock on site depopulated 10 days prior to confirmation of HPAI H5 on the premises:
 - infection cannot be ruled out but the probability is very low.
 - if present, infection occurred only shortly before depopulation
- 5 other associated company breeding premises have been inspected/sampled (possible source) – all negative
- Source hypothesis of undisclosed infection within the company is therefore much less likely.
- Final sampling to confirm no spread to these premises is underway.

Tracings

- Tracing investigations into linked premises ongoing
Small number of higher risk tracings have been identified and sampled – results to date are negative (4/12/2014)
- Large number of low or moderate risk tracings have been identified - results to date are negative (4/12/2014)
- Risk of spread from the highest risk tracing (eggs from the infected flock) has been mitigated with biosecure destruction of the eggs
- **No spread of disease has been identified (4/12/14)**

Surveillance in the PZ/SZ

- Premises in zones

	PZ	SZ
Premises With Susceptible Stock*	70	133

*data is correct to 04/12/2014

- PZ and SZ surveillance ongoing - no evidence of spread of disease to date (4/12/2014)
- Reporting reflects wider awareness of the possibility of avian flu, and provides further evidence that disease is not widespread.

Wild bird surveillance/risk

- The wild bird cases in NL and DE has reduced the uncertainty about the presence of disease in wild birds.
- This does not significantly change the assessed risk of incursion into UK poultry premises from direct wild bird contact, which is still “low” (rare but does occur).
- Concerns about wider environmental contamination reinforces the need for strong biosecurity measures to prevent the indirect contact with wild birds.
- Working with EFSA on the joint opinion and sharing information between the EURL and other affected Member States.

Conclusions and next steps

- Currently working on lifting PZ/SZ.
- Communications with the industry and public remain a priority – highlighting the need for vigilance and high standards of biosecurity.
- Awaiting EURL/EFSA report to add to the information about wild bird surveillance/risk.
- Collating information to submit an application for co-financing.

Thanks to colleagues from Defra, APHA and others who have contributed to this presentation.

For more information please see:

<https://www.gov.uk/avian-influenza-bird-flu>