



Mission of the Community Veterinary Emergency Team (CVET) to the Czech Republic

(29 June-1 July 2017)

Objective

- **Reason:** first occurrence of ASF in the Czech Republic in a wild boar found dead in the suburban area of the city of Zlin
ASF notified on 27 June 2017
- **ToR: provide assistance** to the scientific, technical, managerial and practical on-the-spot assistance on the refinement of the most suitable control and eradication measures for African Swine Fever (ASF) under local conditions, especially **as regards wildlife management and epidemiological investigations.**
- **Expert:** Vittorio Guberti (ITA)



Background

- ASF was reported for the first time in Czech Republic on 26 June 2017 in a wild boar found dead in the suburban area of the city of Zlin.
- Consequently a wild boar **infected area** was established. It encompasses 1004 km², includes 37 municipalities and 89 Hunting grounds in the District of Zlin (C.I.D. EU 2017/1162).
- **Epidemiological investigation** : accidentally or unintended release of infected material originating from a nearby **hospital** or from a **petrol stations** along the road n. 49 were investigated as introduction pathways.



European



Findings and Conclusions

Hospital :

- The open areas of the hospital are very well maintained
- Bins for waste are distributed everywhere
- The main garden is inside the hospital and not in the rear part of it, where the two infected animals have been found
- At the hospital perimeter, between the buildings and the fence, there is an internal paved road
- The fence is well maintained

- It appears that the hospital does **not represent** a risk factor for the accidental dispersion of ASF infected material

Findings and Conclusions

Petrol Stations along road 49.:

- none of them has a dedicated parking area with resting facilities for trucks
- Along the road (north side) many fenced houses are present
- the infected area is separated from the road by a **small river** and a **railway**
- Apparently the road does **not present** any evident risk factor that could explain the accidental dispersion of ASF infected material.

Findings and Conclusions

Risk of infection:

- On both side of road n. 49 there is an industrial area
- Trucks from EU and not EU countries are commonly seen
- Cultivated fields and forest patches border the area
- The **fragmented landscape together with the presence of wild boar represent a higher risk** than the hospital or the petrol stations on the road

Findings and Conclusions

Pig holdings:

- In the infected area a total of 16 holdings with 14.656 pigs
- (with 4 farms have more than 2000 pigs)
- Outdoor keeping of pigs is not a local tradition and not practiced
- specific biosecurity measures are requested to all farms since 2014

Wild boar:

- the post-reproductive density (June-July) is estimated at about **7 wild boar/km²**
- **biosecurity during hunting** is not regulated and it appears that many shot animals are transported and dressed at the hunters' homes while offal are buried on the spot.

Findings and Conclusions

- it is likely that in the area a total of 250-270 wild boars are directly at risk of ASF and 7000 animals at the district level
- Most probably **ASF was introduced the first week of June**. It can be assumed that at least 3 cycles of the infection have been already completed.

Findings and Conclusions

Recommendations

- **Ban of wild boar hunting** until **proper biosecurity** measures will be implemented in the infected area. The measures should follow the EU guidelines and should be authorized by the competent veterinary authorities;
- **Hunters** have to be **trained** to reduce the probability of further spread of the virus in the environment and outside the infected area;

Findings and Conclusions

Recommendations

- In the infected area, **containers** or other means of temporary storage have to be placed. In each storage-point means for cleaning and disinfection have to be available.
- Ban of driven hunts
- In order to reduce wild boar disturbance and possible long distance movements, a temporal rotation of the hunting towers has to be planned.

Findings and Conclusions

Recommendations

- The usual **wild boar management** has to be modified to achieve a strong reduction of wild boar density:
 1. Hunting should target **adult females** followed by **sub-adult females**; the **sex ratio** of the hunting bag has to be set at 1 male : 2 females;
 2. Ban of **any feeding activity**; hay only should be permitted;

Findings and Conclusions

Recommendations

- *Wild boar* **passive surveillance** has to be permanently enforced; each found dead wild boar has to be reported to the local Veterinary Service;
- Active search of wild boar carcasses has to be carried around the city of Zlin
- *Domestic pigs* **passive surveillance** has to be enhanced. All the 16 farms of the district have to report sick or dead animals and to be tested for ASF.

Findings and Conclusions

Recommendations

- **Biosecurity** measures implemented in the domestic pig farms have to be reinforced and verified regularly directly by the Competent Veterinary Authorities.
- The laboratory network has to be reinforced and prepared for a multiple outbreaks/cases scenario. The working flow has to be fine tuned including the testing of bone marrow of old, mummified, wild boar carcasses;

Thank you for your attention!

The CVET rapporteur wishes to thank all colleagues from Czech Republic for their support and help given.

The working atmosphere during the mission was very good. The colleagues from Czech Republic gave all their support and assistance to facilitate a fruitful mission.