



Foot-and-Mouth Disease EUVET mission to Slovak Republic

(24-27 March 2025)

Team: A.-E. Füssel (Team leader), L. Bakkali Kassimi (EU Reflab FMD)

Providing on-the-spot assistance


- most suitable FMD eradication measures
- scientific, technical, managerial aspects
- preparedness and surveillance in domestic and wild cloven-hoofed animals

- Are the FMD control measures in place in Slovakia adequate and effective
- Are the FMD control measures being applied in the region of Dunajska Streda sufficient to prevent spread of FMD within and outside the restricted zones, including biosecurity measures
- Which additional measures are necessary to detect possible further infected premises or to detect possible infection in susceptible wild animals, including surveillance and testing of hunted animals
- Are biosecurity measures applied adequately to protect establishments keeping listed species within the restriction zones
- [GUIDELINES FOR INVESTIGATION OF SUSPICIOUS BIOLOGICAL EVENTS](https://www.woah.org/fileadmin/Home/eng/Our_scientific_expertise/docs/pdf/Guidelines_Investigation_Suspicious_Biological_Events.pdf)
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
Agenda

- 24.3.2025: arrival, meeting in Vet HQ
- 25.3.2025: visit to Braka, Narad, Medvedov
- 26.3.2025: visit to Reflab in Zvolen
- 27.3.2025: meeting with PM and MA
Connection to SCoPAFF
Departure


Administrative Division of Slovakia



Outbreaks 1 to 4 in SK



Restricted zones



Outbreak in
Malá Lúč

Outbreak in
Baka

Outbreak in
Ňarad

Outbreak in
Medveďov

Outbreak in
Kisbajcs (HU)

Medved'ov



Ňárad






European Commission

Baka


- 1 - Káanalizabné potábie
- 2 - Skladovabé náabže na spábkové roby
- 3 - Sklad veterinárných leab






European
Commission

Malá Lúč



Previous Reporting



24/03/2025



**FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE
in Slovakia - state of play**

24th March 2025, PaFF Committee
Martin Chudý, DVM., CVO
State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak Republic

VP1 Sequencing Match with HU isolate



Virological and serological investigations (situation 27.3.2025)

7 samples taken on 20.3.2025 in Medvedov from 3 animals:
6 PCR FMD-AG positive, including 1 out of 3 tested in NSP ELISA positive

9 samples taken on 20.3.2025 in Narad from 3 animals
9 PCR FMD-AG positive, including 0 out of 3 tested in NSP ELISA negative

9 samples taken on 20.3.2025 in Baka from 3 animals
9 PCR FMD-AG positive, including 1 out of 3 tested in NSP ELISA positive

9 samples taken on 26.3.2025 in Mala Luc from 9 animals
3 PCR FMD-AG positive (no other tests so far)

Note: The team discussed ways to improve sampling and testing to reinforce surveillance.

Main conclusions and recommendations

Overall disease control strategy

- The team did not identify major shortcomings in the overall disease control strategy in the region of Dunajska Streda of Slovakia;
- The team noted a close cooperation between the local, regional and central veterinary services, but could not identify a local, regional or central disease control centre in the understanding of the applicable legislation;
- The competent authorities are sufficiently equipped and staffed for the current situation, but may require more resources to intensify surveillance in addition to disease control measures;
- The team observed delays in gathering and systematically processing of important epidemiological information (e.g. follow up on tracing results, linking lab results with epidemiological inquiry etc)
- The team noted the valuable assistance provided by the National Reference Laboratory in Zvolen, which has all the capacities to carry out the necessary testing and may invoke, in case of need, two more regional labs;
- The team met a very professional and powerful civil emergency team assisting during the depopulation.

Main conclusions and recommendations

- According to available information there is no indication that the virus was introduced into the establishment in Medvedov through movements of animals or semen, and at lesser certainty equipment or vehicles;
- While hunting is prohibited in the 10 km restriction zone, efforts should be made to obtain as many as possible samples from wild cloven hoofed animals, taking into account hunting rules. Samples obtained from wildboar, shot and found dead should also be tested for FMD.
- Kept animals of listed species should be protected by adequate and reinforced biosecurity measures with particular emphasis on outdoor/open air holdings, possible contact to wildlife and with respect to agroterrorism.
- There is an urgent need to speed up the gathering, processing and mapping of information on surveillance carried out in restricted areas and on tracing back and forward
- All the restriction measures should be applied not only in line with EU legislation but also with the view to a possible recovery of the WOH FMD freedom.

Main conclusions and recommendations

Surveillance

- Due to the undetermined origin of the infection and the ways of introduction, and taking into account possible risks of contamination of the environment, frequent and regular visits to establishments keeping animals of listed species shall be carried out, taking into account also the principles of risk-based surveillance.
- Surveillance should primarily monitor the spread of FMDV. This requires a well-designed surveillance strategy, which should be coordinated by an expert group at central level.
- Transport of kept terrestrial animals of listed species should be reduced to the minimum and in accordance with established biosafety rules.
- There is a well founded need to introduce ELISA testing for the detection of antibodies to structural proteins of the serotype O.
- Consideration may be given to a milk-monitoring for FMDV (see example of Corona monitoring in waste water)

Emergency vaccination (I)

- The introduction of suppressive vaccination in Medvedov and Narad was a useful decision to lower the immediate pressure on human, logistic and technical resources, but it has delayed the preliminary cleansing and disinfection on the outbreak farms and those farms must remain under surveillance;
- The fourth outbreak is an indication that biosecurity and movement controls alone may not prevent spread of virus. Intensified surveillance including testing to detect incubating animals, and as much as necessary preventive culling, must bring the control measures ahead of the disease;
- The geographical situation, the prevailing winds, but also the disposal capacity, should be taken into account when designing a possible vaccination zone.

Emergency vaccination (II)

- There are large pig farms in the region that must be protected effectively, first of all through strict biosecurity. The risks of over-crowding could possibly be addressed by a system of single occupancy licenses as operated in 2001 in UK, and eventually a breeding ban.
- If suppressive vaccination was planned, consideration could be given to the vaccination of fattening pig herds to lower the risks of possible virus excretion, while the animals could be slaughtered for local consumption;
- To lower the density of susceptible animals in the region, reinforced slaughter of fattening animals could be envisaged;



The EU-VET team would like to thank all colleagues In Slovakia for their support and assistance.

The EU-VET team experienced a fruitful and cooperative working atmosphere during the mission.